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ABSTRACT
Inflation targeting (IT), in simplistic terms, is a monetary policy regime that is based upon the
commitment of a country’s monetary authority to meeting predetermined, quantitative targets
for the annual rate of inflation. IT has attained popularity and widespread acclamation
amongst policymakers in the international context over the past three decades. Since Egypt
initiated a new economic and structural reform program supported by the Extended Fund
Facility from the IMF in November 2016, the search for a new nominal anchor for the
Egyptian economy has been underway. In this regard, the new objective seems to be a
temporary switch to a monetary targeting regime in the short run, while moving towards the
implementation of a full-fledged IT regime in the medium term. Against this background, the
Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) recently released a draft law indicating its desire to transition
towards IT. This paper aims to answer the question of whether or not Egypt is ready for the
implementation of IT. I propose a twofold methodology based on an assessment of the
institutional and technical framework currently in place in Egypt, combined with a
comprehensive survey of the current international practices of 28 inflation-targeting countries
to determine whether or not the Egyptian framework is adequate in meeting the basic
preconditions for IT, and to identify the practical considerations that need to be taken into
account if the CBE indeed decides to adopt an inflation targeting regime in the near future.
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1. Introduction
Inflation targeting, in simplistic terms, is a monetary policy regime that is
based upon the commitment of a country’s monetary authority to meeting
predetermined, quantitative targets for the annual rate of inflation. Inflation targeting
(IT) has attained popularity and widespread acclamation amongst policymakers in the
international context over the past three decades. Ever since the Reserve Bank of New
Zealand pioneered the new monetary policy regime when it historically became the
first central bank to officially set and commit to an explicit quantitative inflation
target in 1990, IT has attracted the attention of central banks around the world. The
attractiveness of inflation targeting has not been limited to developed countries; many
emerging market economies were quick to make the transition to an inflation
targeting regime, and the number of developing countries adopting IT seems to be on
the rise. Egypt is no exception to this phenomenon. Talks of an IT monetary policy
regime in Egypt have been in the works since 2005 (Al-mashat, 2008), but it was only
recently that the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) released a draft law that is currently
under review by Parliament in which it formally declared its intention to officially
transition towards a full fledged IT regime. The proposed draft law comes in
conjunction with the new economic and structural reform program that Egypt initiated
in November 2016 supported by the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) from the IMF. One
of the major objectives of the IMF program is the transition to a fully-fledged IT
regime in the medium term.
In defining the main characteristics of an IT regime, Mishkin (1999) lists the
defining features of inflation targeting as follows:
•

the setting, and public announcement of quantitative, specific targets
for inflation that are to be met within a specific time horizon,
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•

an official commitment on the part of the country’s monetary authority
to price stability as its overriding objective,

•

less emphasis on intermediary targets such as money growth,

•

more transparent policy-making on the part of the central bank,

•

and a high degree of accountability of the central bank towards
meeting its announced policy objectives.

It is also important to understand an inflation-targeting regime in the context
of other monetary policy regimes. The four major monetary policy regimes practiced
currently by central banks globally are (1) exchange rate targeting, (2) monetary
targeting, (3) inflation targeting, and (4) monetary policy with an implicit nominal
anchor (but not an explicit one). Exchange rate targeting involves fixing the value of
the practicing country’s domestic currency to that of a large, low inflation country.
Monetary targeting, which is the monetary policy regime currently in place in Egypt,
revolves around stabilizing price levels through an intermediary target, namely,
money growth. In doing so, the central bank targets inflation indirectly, which is the
major difference between monetary targeting and inflation targeting. Implicit nominal
anchor targeting involves the central bank committing to an implied nominal anchor
without explicitly announcing it. The most prominent example of the use of this type
of strategy is the Federal Reserve, which has, for many years, pursued an implicit
nominal anchor exemplified in the overriding concern by the Federal Reserve to keep
inflation low and stable without explicitly pursuing an IT regime.
Inflation targeting is the youngest of the four regimes, meaning it has the
shortest history and track record. Nonetheless, after the New Zealand experience in
introducing inflation targeting proved successful in achieving its objectives (Sherwin,
1999), Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia were early followers in the

8

adoption of an IT framework, all enacting a formal IT framework in 1991, 1992, and
1993 respectively (Roger, 2010). Despite it being a relatively demanding regime,
inflation targeting was also adopted by a number of emerging countries, with Brazil
and Chile being the first two emerging economies to formally enact inflation targeting
in 1999. Since then, IT has been officially adopted by almost 30 countries, with a
number of countries attempting a transition toward it.
The question then becomes: if IT has exhibited such widespread success in
numerous developed and emerging economies alike, what motivation there is to study
the viability of IT in Egypt? The fact of the matter is that despite its success, IT has
not been immune to a fair share of criticism. Indeed, especially for the case of a
developing country such as Egypt, one must take into consideration the demanding
nature of the IT framework compared to other monetary regimes: an extremely high
degree of central bank independence and accountability, the absence of fiscal
dominance, having a sound financial system as well as a deeply banked economy are
just some of the many institutional prerequisites needed for a successful
implementation of IT. A near impeccable understanding of transmission mechanisms
of monetary policy and a solid capacity to accurately forecast inflation are some of
the technical prerequisites that are needed (Youssef, 2007).
The motivation for this research is two-fold. Firstly, since the global financial
crisis of 2008, the global debate around the validity of a strict IT regime has
intensified, so much so that some economists have asserted, “inflation targeting died
when the Lehman Brothers died” (Reichlin & Baldwin, 2013). Many economists and
policymakers have questioned the ability of IT to stabilize economies after the
significant downturn of the U.S. economy during the crisis, despite its low inflation
levels. Some have argued that IT, in its strict form, hinders the capability of central
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banks to address other important macroeconomic outcomes such as growth and
employment (Woodford, 2012). Hence, the first, somewhat peripheral, motivation for
this research is to contribute to the global dialogue on IT.
The second, more focal, motivation is the relevance of the topic to the
Egyptian economy today. Since Egypt initiated a new economic and structural reform
program supported by the Extended Fund Facility from the IMF in November 2016 which encompassed the floatation of the exchange rate as one of the major reforms
required - the search for a new nominal anchor has been underway. In this regard, the
new objective seems to be a temporary switch to a monetary targeting regime in the
short run, while moving towards the implementation of a full-fledged IT regime in the
medium term. In order to achieve this objective, the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE),
released a draft law indicating its desire to transition towards IT. The draft law is
currently undergoing review by the Egyptian Parliament. Despite the fact that the
CBE claims to have been working towards a transition to IT since 2005, the new draft
law will be the first official, explicit announcement indicating the movement towards
a formal adoption of IT in Egypt. National media outlets have since been extremely
active in stirring up controversy about the CBE draft law as a whole, and in particular
about article 19, which explicitly stipulates the adoption of an IT monetary policy
regime (Abdelrazek, 2017; Moustafa, 2017). This research, is hence motivated by the
desire to develop a solid ground on which to build a case on whether or not Egypt is
prepared for the adoption of an IT regime.
The objectives of the research are contemplated as follows:
•

Gauge the implications of IT for small, open, developing economies like
Egypt;
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•

Determine whether IT is the best monetary policy for Egypt under the current
circumstances, taking into account the advantages and disadvantages of IT in
relation to its alternatives;

•

Examine in detail the basic technical and institutional framework required for
adoption of an IT regime;

•

Assess thoroughly and comprehensively the country experiences with IT to
determine how an IT regime can be tailored to the specific case of Egypt;

•

Evaluate Egypt’s situation in terms of its progress in preparing the economy
for IT adoption and pinpointing the potential implementation challenges;

•

Provide recommendations regarding steps that can be taken to better prepare
Egypt for IT
A twofold methodology is employed based on an assessment of the

institutional and technical framework currently in place in Egypt, combined with a
comprehensive survey of the current international practices of 28 inflation-targeting
countries to determine whether or not the Egyptian framework is adequate in meeting
the basic preconditions for IT, and to identify the practical considerations that need to
be taken into account if the CBE indeed decides to adopt an inflation targeting regime
in the near future. Thus, this paper aims to objectively evaluate the research question
of whether or not Egypt is ready to adopt a fully-fledged IT regime. In answering this
question through the research, this study looks into country experiences with IT,
focusing on the implications of IT for developing economies like Egypt. It also
intends to dissect in detail the basic technical and institutional preconditions necessary
for IT and the degree to which they are fulfilled in Egypt. Finally, it intends to look
into what steps can be taken to better prepare Egypt for IT if indeed that is the path
the central bank intends to take in the near future.
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2. Literature Review
2.1 Conceptual Framework of Inflation Targeting
2.1.1 Monetary Policy Regimes in the Context of the Rules vs. Discretion Debate
In studying the conceptual framework of IT, it is important to first look into
the roots of monetary policy as a whole. Indeed, IT as a framework for monetary
policy, like all other monetary policy frameworks, was developed as a means to an
end. Ultimately, the goal of monetary policy as a part of overall macroeconomic
policy is to contribute to the growth of the economy through price stability (Friedman,
1968). The importance of price stability as the overriding objective of monetary
policy became even more pronounced starting in the 1990’s, a period commonly
known as “the low inflation era”. This period, also known as “The Great Moderation"
was distinguished as a period in which low and stable inflation and moderate growth
rates were registered in most advanced economies (Poloz, 2015). The objective of
price stability is in its simplest form defined as the achievement and maintenance of
low, stable levels of inflation (Svensson, 2000). Price stability is essential to
economic growth because it reduces uncertainty and allows for efficient allocation of
productive resources without the distortive effect of inflation on economic agents’
decision making. Additionally, price stability mitigates the adverse impact that high
inflation has on the poorest sectors of society, since inflation contributes to unfair
redistribution of income and wealth (White, 2006).
In their attempts to achieve price stability, central banks have historically
resorted to different intermediate targets to aid in the attainment of their final goal.
This is where the concept of a nominal anchor enters the discussion. In simplistic
terms, a nominal anchor is a tool used by a country’s monetary authority to contain
the price level within that country (Mishkin, 1999). In essence, the ultimate objective
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of a monetary policy framework is to provide a nominal anchor to the economy. The
literature shows that there are four main nominal anchors, namely, exchange rate
targeting, monetary targeting, implicit nominal anchor targeting, and most recently,
inflation targeting.
But before delving into an extensive explanation of the three nominal anchor
frameworks, the theoretical background of monetary policy encompassed in what is
known as the rules vs. discretion debate on monetary policy needs to be explained.
The rules vs. discretion debate is one of the longest-standing debates in the
history of monetary policy. It focuses on the relative benefits and costs of designing
and implementing monetary policy such that central banks adhere to stringent,
predetermined rules, as opposed to allowing them flexibility and placing more
emphasis on subjective judgment in responding to macroeconomic shocks as they
arise (Van Lear, 2000).
The major argument for rule-based monetary policy proclaims that, when
there are no set rules, governments can influence decision-making of central banks in
order to achieve short-term goals that are inconsistent with the ultimate goal of price
stability. For example, in order to keep unemployment rates low, governments may
push inflation up above its natural level (Barro & Gordon, 1983). This gave rise to the
“time inconsistency model”, the underlying theory of why central bank credibility
gains associated with a rule-based framework are important for achieving price
stability. The time inconsistency model, which was first introduced by Kydland and
Prescott (1977) and later extended by Barro and Gordon (1983), contends that the
government suffers from inflationary bias that results in suboptimum inflation
outcomes; that is, actual inflation is consistently higher than the optimal level.
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While rule-based policymaking may be advantageous in mitigating the effects
of time inconsistency, proponents of discretionary policy argue that sticking to a
predetermined set of rules does not allow central banks enough flexibility to respond
quickly to unforeseen changes in the macroeconomic environment, thereby limiting
their capacity to ameliorate the effects of sudden, unexpected shocks to the economy.
Fischer (1989) notes that the concept of rules vs. discretion in monetary policy
should be contemplated as a continuum rather than two distinct extremes. Where a
monetary policy framework lies on this continuum depends on the degree of
autonomy of the central bank, how strictly defined its objectives are, and the strength
of the relationship between its policy decisions and the achievement of those
objectives.
2.1.2 Alternatives to Inflation Targeting
In practice, no monetary policy regime can be classified as exclusively
belonging to either extreme. To better grasp the conceptual background of inflation
targeting, it is important to first understand the theoretical advantages and limitations
of its major predecessors: exchange rate targeting, monetary targeting, and monetary
policy with an implicit, but not explicit nominal anchor.
Exchange rate targeting (ERT), which involves tying the domestic currency to
that of another foreign currency or basket of currencies, or to a commodity (such as
gold) has been in practice by central banks since the introduction of the gold standard
in 1870 (Cooper, 1999). Based on its defining characteristics, ERT could be placed
towards the rule side of the rule vs. discretion continuum. Thus, discretion in
monetary policy is almost non-existent under ERT, virtually eliminating the problem
of time inconsistency. This constitutes the major advantage of ERT. An exchange rate
target is also simple and easy for the public to understand. However, as history has
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shown, ERT has a fatal disadvantage in that it entails a loss of independent monetary
policy for the practicing country (Mishkin, 1999). Indeed, the impossible trinity of
monetary policy indicates that tying the domestic exchange rate to that of another
economy in the case of an open economy with free capital flows automatically entails
the sacrifice of the central bank’s ability to conduct autonomous monetary policy
(Obstfeld & Taylor, 1998). The central bank’s policies become directly tied to those
of its anchor country, even when almost certainly, each of them will face different
economic conditions and business cycles. The asymmetric shock phenomenon entails
that not only will the targeting economy’s central bank lose the ability to respond to
domestic shocks, but the anchor economy’s shocks are also transmitted to the
targeting economy (Mishkin, 1999). Additionally, ERT puts countries at risk of
speculative attacks on their currency (Obstfeld & Rogoff, 1995). Accountability of the
central bank is also not pronounced since the central bank has limited capacity to
make operational decisions with regards to monetary policy.
In response to the limitations posed by exchange rate targeting, another
monetary policy regime known as monetary targeting (MT) came into practice.
Monetary targeting involves targeting price stability through an intermediary target,
namely, money aggregates (Neupauerová & Vravec, 2007). Under an MT framework,
the monetary authority steers policy decisions towards controlling monetary
aggregates, led by the conviction that these aggregates are the main driver of inflation
over in the long run. Thus, while an explicit inflation target is not announced, and
central bank intervention is focused largely in the money market.
The most important advantage that monetary targeting presents over ERT is that
it allows central banks to conduct monetary policy independent from an “anchor
country” to respond to domestic considerations. Additionally, monetary targeting
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implicitly entails having a floating exchange rate in theory, which acts as a shock
absorber that insulates the domestic economy from foreign shocks (Senay &
Sutherland, 2007). Since money supply is controlled by the central bank itself,
another advantage is that the central bank can easily measure and observe the money
aggregates that it targets. This ease of observability and measurability of monetary
targets means that real-time information about whether the central bank is achieving
its target is easily accessible. Albeit, the major drawback of using an intermediary
target (money aggregates) to achieve an ultimate end goal (price stability) is that it
mandates the existence of a consistently strong and stable relationship between the
two. If the relationship between monetary aggregates and inflation is unpredictable or
weak, it becomes nearly impossible to apply monetary targeting successfully, and the
credibility of the central bank suffers as a result, casting doubt on the viability of
monetary targeting to serve as an effective system to enhance central bank
accountability and transparency (Estrella & Mishkin, 1997). This is an especially
relevant issue for developing countries. Nevertheless, it follows that monetary
targeting is more discretionary than it is rule-based since the central bank targets an
intermediary target of monetary aggregates, which are under the direct control of the
central bank itself (Mishkin, 1999).
The final monetary policy regime that is often overlooked in theory but remains
very much present in practice is the use of an implicit nominal anchor rather than an
explicit one. The most prominent example of the use of this type of strategy is the
Federal Reserve, which has, for many years, pursued an implicit nominal anchor
exemplified in the overriding concern by the Federal Reserve to keep inflation low
and stable without explicitly pursuing an inflation targeting regime (Mishkin, 1999).
This strategy, dubbed the “just do it” strategy by Mishkin, puts significant weight on
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the subjective judgment and decision making abilities of the Board members of the
Central Bank. Due to the long lags that exist between the time monetary policy
decisions are made and when their impact on inflation is realized, this monetary
policy regime emphasizes the need for forward-looking, preemptive policy making
that forecasts and takes measures to control inflation before its signs begin to show on
the economy. Monetary policy with an implicit but not explicit nominal anchor has
proven its propensity to succeed as demonstrated by the Federal Reserve of the United
States. Since 1991, the Fed has been successful in keeping inflation low and stable,
registering positive inflation rates below 3.5% consistently with the exception of the
year 2008, during which inflation peaked at 3.8%, and a negative inflation rate of 0.4% the following year due to the global financial crisis (World Bank). Despite the
aforementioned success, the lack of an explicit official nominal anchor inevitably
takes a toll on the transparency of the Central Bank and its tendency to communicate
with the public. This major disadvantage becomes especially critical when
considering the case of developing countries, where credibility of the central bank is
often not backed by a strong track record to begin with. Additionally, the fact that the
central bank becomes accountable to the general public to a lesser degree entails that
it is more likely to succumb to political pressure, and thus more likely to fall into the
time-inconsistency problem.
2.1.3 Advantages and Disadvantages of Inflation Targeting
With the aforementioned relationship between money aggregates and inflation
starting to break down in countries practicing monetary targeting such as Canada, the
United States, and the United Kingdom to name a few, the first seeds of inflation
targeting were sown in New Zealand in 1990 (Mishkin, 1999). An IT regime is
characterized by five defining features: 1) the setting of quantitative, specific targets
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for inflation that are to be met within a specific time horizon, and the public
announcement of these targets, (2) an official commitment on the part of the monetary
authority to price stability as its overriding objective, and its superiority over any
other objectives, (3) less emphasis on intermediary targets such as money growth, (4)
increased communication with the public regarding monetary policy, which mandates
increased transparency and (5) augmented accountability of the monetary authority to
the general public. Under these features, the central bank should have enough
freedom to use monetary policy tools to achieve its end goal of price stability. Thus,
the concept of defining IT as a framework of “constrained discretion” was introduced
by Bernanke in 1997 (Bernanke & Mishkin, 1997).
The classification of IT as constrained discretion is fitting, since it is a
framework that incorporates both rule-based elements, through the announcement and
commitment to an explicit numerical inflation target, and discretionary elements
embodied in the operational freedom of the central bank to make monetary policy
decisions as it sees fitting in order to achieve that target (Jahan, 2017).
The strongest advantage of IT is that it circumvents the drawbacks of its
predecessors. First of all, like monetary targeting, IT necessarily entails that the
country must have a floating exchange rate to enable the central bank to conduct
monetary policy independently, and so the issue of asymmetric shocks inherent in
exchange rate targeting is avoided and there is capacity to respond to domestic
shocks. Additionally, targeting inflation itself as the end goal of monetary targeting
rather than an intermediary target of money aggregates decreases the monetary policy
regime’s reliance on the existence of a strong relationship between the two. By
providing an explicit numerical target for inflation, IT also provides the benefit of a
rule-based framework in that avoids the time inconsistency problem (Bean, 2016).
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Inherent in IT is also increased transparency and accountability of the central bank for
attaining the announced inflation objective. Inflation figures are also more easily
perceived and understood by the general public than are monetary targets. Advocates
of IT claim that a major benefit of IT is increased ability of the central bank to reduce
inflation levels and inflation volatility, without adversely impacting output (Ayres,
Belasen, & Kutan, 2014).
IT, however, is not without its limitations, especially if it is practiced with too
much emphasis on strict and literal rules. It has been argued that inflation-targeting
central banks that place too much weight on reaching preset inflation goals implicitly
ignore other important macroeconomic variables such as output, employment and the
exchange rate, which results in poor outcomes for these variables (Libich, 2011).
Sacrifices in output may also be magnified during disinflation if economic agents do
not trust the credibility of the central bank to achieve its mandate of low and stable
inflation (Jonsson, 1999). The global financial crisis of 2008 also shed light on the
shortcomings of IT. While some may argue that the minimal effect that the global
crisis of 2008 had on inflation rates despite it being one of the largest economic
shocks in recent memory reflects the success of IT, others concur the 2008 crisis only
highlights its disadvantages. Even though inflation targeting countries were generally
able to keep inflation rates around the target, they were plagued with an economic
slowdown that pulled growth rates down to plummeting levels and left countless
people unemployed, thereby bringing up the notion that IT could in fact be “a victim
of its own success” (Gillitzer & Simon, 2015). Critics of IT thus argue that too much
focus on inflation as a sole mandate is detrimental to the economy as a
whole. Another issue with IT is that it is a heavily demanding framework that
comprises several prerequisites for successful implementation. This in itself is
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disadvantageous, because it limits the scope of countries that are eligible to adopt IT
to those countries that satisfy most of these prerequisites.
2.1.4 Prerequisites for Inflation Targeting
One of the most well documented disadvantages of IT is its demanding and
unforgiving nature as a monetary policy regime in terms of the prerequisites that are
purported in the theoretical literature to be crucial for its proper implementation
(Eichengreen, Masson, Savastano, & Sharma, 1999). A thorough understanding of
these prerequisites (which are generally categorized into institutional and technical
prerequisites) is critical in order to completely assimilate the conceptual framework
underlying in IT. It should be noted that satisfying some of these preconditions
(especially institutional conditions, such as Central Bank independence), is important
for the successful conduct of monetary policy in general under any monetary policy
regime. However, the weight placed on satisfying these preconditions is even more
pronounced under IT, as a result of its heavier reliance on the role of Central Bank
transparency and credibility in the formulation of inflation expectations (Masson,
Savastano, & Sharma, 1997).
Institutional Prerequisites
•

Independence of the Central Bank

Independence of the central bank is the cornerstone, and likely the most
important institutional prerequisite for the implementation of IT. This prompts an
important discussion about the distinction between instrument and goal independence
and whether or not both are conducive to an IT regime. Goal independence implies
that the Central Bank would have complete autonomy in setting the inflation target
that it will work towards itself, while instrument independence, or operational
independence, implies that the Central Bank would have the discretion to conduct
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monetary policy towards achieving the target, without necessarily being a part of the
decision making process in setting it. As the monetary authority in the economy, the
central bank should have complete operational independence in setting monetary
policy instruments to achieve the preset inflation target, implying a separation of
authority between fiscal and monetary institutions and allowing the Central Bank to
focus on its primary mandate of achieving low and stable inflation (Sims, 2016). This
implies that the central bank should not be subject to any form of political pressure
from the country’s fiscal authority on monetary policy decision making under IT
(Ćorić, 2007), and that the central bank should have enough autonomy to be entirely
focused on achieving its ultimate goal of price stability (Youssef, 2007). For example,
the organizational structure board of directors (or the entity responsible for setting
monetary policy instruments) should be assembled in a way that eliminates political
pressure.
•

Absence of Other Nominal Anchors

IT also requires, in theory, the absence of other nominal anchors and a
willingness on the part of the central bank to commit to price stability as the
overarching goal of monetary policy (A Mishra & Mishra, 2009).
•

High Degree of Transparency and Accountability

In compliance with the high level of independence granted to the central bank,
an amplified degree of accountability is required. Under IT, there is a need to set in
place transparency and accountability measures to enhance the credibility of the
central bank and ultimately, the effectiveness of monetary policy.
•

Fiscal Consolidation, and Lack of Fiscal Dominance

Fiscal consolidation (which refers to the lack of large, persistent fiscal deficits
and government debts) and the absence of fiscal dominance (which refers to a
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situation where fiscal authorities have power to intervene in monetary policy
decisions to maintain government solvency in a manner that is detrimental to the
ultimate goal of monetary policy) are also critical conditions for the assurance of
central bank independence, and thus success in IT (Woodford, 2001). Under fiscal
dominance, the financial needs of the government overshadow the conduct of
independent monetary policy (Khan, 2003). When the government has enough
influence on monetary decision-making, it can exert pressure on the central bank to
monetize a part of its deficit through printing money (also known as seigniorage
revenue), which in turn has an inflationary impact on the economy that is
counterproductive to IT (Kumhof, Nunes, & Yakadina, 2010).
Technical Prerequisites
•

The need to construct a suitable price index for measurement of the inflation

target and progress made towards its attainment constitutes an important technical
prerequisite for IT (Silver, 2006; Vredin, 2015).
•

Technical capabilities of the central bank to make use of all available data in a

forward-looking manner to construct accurate and timely inflation forecasts (and
analysis of potential scenarios) is necessary for the adoption of IT (Duman, 2002).
•

In order for IT to work, there must be a strong and reliable transmission

mechanism that links between monetary policy instruments that are in the direct
control of the central bank, and the goal of inflation. This requires the existence of
a deep, stable financial system and sophisticated credit markets that allow for tools
such as the interest rate to have predictable effects on inflation (Carare et al , 2002;
Laurens et al, 2014).
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2.2 Empirical Literature on Inflation Targeting
Relevant empirical studies on IT can be categorized around two main areas of
focus: the results and effectiveness of IT as measured by its impact on different
macroeconomic variables, and how necessary the satisfaction of preconditions of IT is
to its success in practicing countries. Since the first pioneers of inflation targeting
were developed, industrialized countries, most of the research pertaining to the
evaluation of the results of IT and its impact on macroeconomic parameters is focused
on those developed countries that have had the longest history with the framework.
On the other hand, emerging and developing countries are more often utilized for
research related to the effect of meeting the prerequisites of IT, since many of the ITpracticing emerging and developing countries lacked some (if not most) of the
theoretically proposed preconditions for IT when it was first introduced
2.2.1 Empirical Literature on the Results and Effectiveness of IT
Empirical studies on the results of IT include studying the effect of IT and
macroeconomic variables such as the level of inflation, inflation volatility, output
growth, output gap variability, the sacrifice ratio (the cost of bringing down inflation),
the exchange rate, and current account balances, to name a few. In general, it is
thought that bringing inflation down, while central to the proper functioning of an
economy, is quite costly in terms of its impact on other macroeconomic variables
such as output growth and employment (Ball, 1994).
A large body of research has been employed to test the effect of IT on
inflation levels and volatility. Much of this research has concluded that inflation
levels have dropped significantly in the years after the adoption of an IT regime in
most countries. For example, Pétursson (2004) concluded that the first six countries
adopting IT exhibited a drop in inflation rates from an average of 9% in the five years
prior to adoption of IT to 3.5% in the year after adoption. More generally, for 21
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countries that were classified officially as IT’ers in 2004, the inflation rate dropped
from an average of 31% in the 5 years prior to adoption of IT to 4.5% the year after
its adoption. Neumann & Hagen (2002) compared six inflation-targeting countries
and three non-targeting countries across two sample periods (a pre-IT period and a
post-IT period). The authors conclude that inflation targeting countries achieved
lower levels of inflation and inflation and interest rate volatility as a result of central
bank credibility gains associated with committing to inflation targets. C. E S
Gonçalves & Salles (2008) found that for a sample of 36 economies (including 13
with an explicit IT regime in place), the countries with IT achieved statistically and
economically significant reductions in inflation levels and inflation volatility when
compared to countries that employed other monetary policy regimes. Applying the
propensity scoring method to a sample of 109 potential inflation-targeting countries,
Vega and Winkelried (2005) find that significantly lower inflation levels and
volatility are achieved when IT is adopted. Valera, Holmes and Hassan (2017)
employ a GARCH model and find that for eight Asian economies, IT has a significant
effect on lowering inflation rates but its the effect is not significant on lowering
inflation volatility.
While the aforementioned evidence supporting the success of IT in bringing
down inflation levels and volatility may seem convincing and ample, not much
supplementary investigation is needed to demonstrate that a comparable amount of
evidence exists that suggests the contrary. Indeed, many researchers have questioned
whether the association between the drop in average inflation rates and IT is one of
causality, or merely correlation. Debelle et al (1999) critically scrutinize the purported
success of IT, arguing that non-inflation targeting economies experienced similar
reductions in inflation levels and volatility during the 1990’s, which points to the
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proposition that the 1990s represented a period with conditions conducive to inflation
reduction in general, regardless of whether countries employed an IT regime or not.
Cecchetti and Ehrmann (1999), who also find that inflation rates were reduced by the
23 countries surveyed in the 1990’s relative to the 1980’s regardless of the level of
development, geography, or whether or not an inflation-targeting regime was in place,
reached a similar conclusion. Honda (2000) finds that the adoption of IT had no
significant impact on the reduction of inflation levels and volatility for New Zealand,
Canada, and Australia, three of the pioneering economies in IT. Similarly, Lin and Ye
(2007) use a propensity scoring method to evaluate the treatment effect of IT adoption
on inflation levels and volatility in seven countries, and find that IT has no significant
effect on both outcomes, discrediting the importance of IT in attaining even its most
basic objectives. These sources, to name a few1, make it difficult to suggest a strong
causal relationship between the implementation of IT and the reduction of inflation
rates and volatility.
Some empirical research looks beyond the obvious macroeconomic effects of
an inflation-targeting regime and instead focuses on the effect of IT on output, output
volatility and the sacrifice ratio (the cost of disinflation) when compared to other
monetary policy regimes. This prompts an important discussion about the inherent
tradeoff between inflation and output. Indeed, it is well established both theoretically
and empirically that disinflations do not come without the cost of a subsequent
reduction in output: this is the basis on which the concept of the sacrifice ratio is built.
The sacrifice ratio is defined as the percentage loss in output relative to the percentage
drop in inflation (Ball, 1993). For countries that wish to embark on disinflationary
reforms to bring inflation down, the question then becomes what monetary regime
1

(Dotsey, 2006; Rogoff, 2003; Walsh, 2009) also conclude that the effect of IT in
bringing down inflation is questionable.
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achieves disinflation at the lowest cost, i.e. with the lowest sacrifice ratio. In this
regard, the empirical literature pertaining to how an IT regime compares to other
regimes in terms of the cost of disinflation is quite divided. Corbo & Schmidt-Hebbel
(2000) find that for five Latin American IT economies, the output sacrifice ratio and
output volatility are reduced in the period following the adoption of inflation targeting
when compared to the pre-IT period, and are either lower than or comparable to other
non-inflation targeting industrialized economies. Consistent with this finding,
Gonçalves and Carvalho (2009) find that among a sample of OECD countries, those
with IT regimes in place experience smaller sacrifice ratios than non-targeting
economies during periods of disinflation. Debelle (1999) finds that in practice, IT
regimes have proven flexible enough to allow for a lower degree of output variability
than other monetary policy regimes.
Brito and Bystedt (2010), on the other hand, find that the implementation of an
IT regime has no impact on the cost of disinflation. Additionally, Cecchetti and
Ehrmann (1999) find that across a sample of 23 countries, 9 of which are explicit
inflation targeting economies, the inflation targeting countries suffer the highest
output volatility. Roux and Hofstetter (2012) conclude that the effect of IT on the
reduction of output sacrifice ratios depends on the length of the disinflationary
process; IT adoption only reduces the sacrifice ratio when the disinflationary process
is implemented gradually over a longer time period as a result of the credibility
gained as a result of the Central Bank committing to an explicit target for inflation.
However, in the event of an abrupt disinflation, IT countries experience higher
sacrifice ratios. Thus, the literature on the effect of IT on output volatility and output
sacrifice ratios seems inconclusive and subject to debate.
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The divide on literature pertaining to the empirical macroeconomic outcomes
of IT extends to the effect of IT on exchange rate volatility and the current account.
Rose (2007) assesses panel data across 45 countries and concludes that the credibility
gains associated with IT result in lower exchange rate volatility, less “sudden stops”
in capital flows, with no negative effect on the current account balance. Sobrino
(2010), however, critiques Rose’s approach, and contends that accounting for global
economic shocks produces contradicting results, whereby IT is actually found to have
negative impacts on the current account balances in 19 countries. Additionally,
Edwards (2006) concludes that exchange rate volatility increases in three out of five
IT countries studied as a result of these countries adopting a floating exchange rate
regime to implement IT.
Despite the fact that the empirical research on IT in the last two decades has
been immense in quality and quantity, the effect of IT on macroeconomic
performance is still not conclusive, and the literature has yet to establish a strong
causality relationship between IT and macroeconomic performance, possibly pointing
to the proposition that IT may not be a “one-size-fits-all” tool for bringing inflation
under control.
2.2.2 Empirical Literature on Linking the Satisfaction of IT Prerequisites to its
Success
The second part of the empirical literature on IT is concerned with the
applicability of IT to developing and emerging market economies. The theoretical
literature on IT stresses the importance of key “preconditions” that should be satisfied
in order to guarantee the success of IT. A large body of literature has been dedicated
to the investigation of the feasibility of IT in these countries where preconditions are
lacking. In other words, this part of the empirical literature revolves around testing the
degree to which satisfying the aforementioned prerequisites is indeed essential to
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successful adoption and implementation of IT. Batini & Laxton (2006) argue that
most emerging market economies do not satisfy all (or even most) of the prerequisites
proposed in the theoretical framework, and hence, they represent a prolific ground on
which the degree of necessity of meeting the theoretical preconditions can be
investigated. This instigates a dialogue on how developing and emerging market
economies differ in practice from developed ones in the context of IT. Mishkin (2000)
cites high degrees of fiscal dominance as evidenced by a high incidence of
seigniorage financing, lack of fiscal consolidation, shallow credit markets, unstable
financial systems, and lacking technical capabilities, including difficulty in selecting
an appropriate measure for inflation and modeling accurate forecasts for inflation, as
major impediments to the successful implementation of IT in the emerging market
context when compared to developed economies.
Government dependence on seigniorage, a form of revenue that fiscal
authorities collect as a result of their ability to influence monetary policy towards
printing more money to finance government deficits, is a significant indicator of fiscal
dominance. Debelle, Masson, Savastano, & Sharma (1998) found that developing
countries rely on seigniorage revenues that account for an average of 1.4%-3% of
GDP, which is significantly higher than the reliance on seigniorage in developed
countries which averaged less than 1% of GDP during the same 16-year time span.
Ismailov, Kakinaka and Miyamoto (2016) find that the tendency of less developed,
low-income countries to have larger fiscal deficits and public debts makes them less
likely to adopt IT regimes than high-income countries as a result of their
governments’ constant reliance on central bank financing. Additionally, it has been
shown historically that less developed countries are less capable of conducting fiscal
adjustments in a sustainable way which in turn harms investment, with 30%-70% of
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the decrease in fiscal expenditures being cut from spending on infrastructure in less
developed countries, thereby questioning the viability of IT in these countries (Buffie
& Atolia, 2016).
Empirical research as also been extensively conducted to test one of the
preconditions of a well-functioning IT regime in emerging economies: the proper and
accurate understanding of the relationship between monetary policy tools and its
ultimate goal, inflation. The vector autoregressive model (VAR) and Granger
causality tests in the bivariate and multivariate forms have been used extensively in
the literature to test the aforementioned relationship. In line with the methods
undertaken by Gottschalk and Moore (2001), Tutar (2002) and, more recently, by
Bakradze and Billmeier (2007), and more recently Mishra and Mishra (2010) and
Odior (2012), this paper intends to use the VAR methodology and subsequent
bivariate and multivariate Granger-causality tests to determine the strength of the
relationship between monetary policy tools and inflation, taking into account the
effects of other interrelated macroeconomic variables2.
Some of the literature highlights the significant weight given to level of
fulfillment of the prerequisites for IT in determining whether or not implementing
countries will succeed. These sources tend to conclude that emerging markets where
prerequisites are lacking could achieve better results by abiding by a more
“conventional” monetary policy framework, such as exchange rate targeting
(Eichengreen et al., 1999). For example, the World Economic Outlook of 2001
suggests that absence of necessary institutional preconditions in general, and fiscal
discipline in particular, in most developing economies will pose as a massive threat to
the sustainability of IT success. Angeriz and Arestis (2007) also find that the lack of
2

An in-depth review of the studies conducted using this methodology and their results
are presented in Section 6.2 of this paper.
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institutional and technical capabilities of emerging markets undermines their capacity
to achieve success under IT. Carare and Stone (2006) employ empirical analysis that
supports the notion that that emerging market economies wishing to transition into
fully-fledged IT regimes should first work towards improving their fiscal position and
the depth of the financial system in order to warrant the adoption of IT.
Despite the anticipated challenges associated with adoption of IT in emerging
market countries, thirteen out of 28 countries classified by the IMF officially as
inflation targeting economies are developing/emerging market economies as of today.
A study on IT in 21 countries shows that almost 80% of the emerging economies in
the sample lacked the basic institutional and technical prerequisites proposed by the
theoretical framework, but that this did not prevent them from reaping the economic
benefits of IT. For example, Israel and the Philippines were characterized by high
public debt/GDP ratios and sizeable government budget deficits at the time of IT
adoption (Batini & Laxton, 2006). In another survey conducted by the IMF on 21
inflation-targeting central banks, it was concluded that not a single country (including
developed economies) had completely satisfied all the prerequisites at the time of
adoption of IT (Batini & Kuttner, 2005).
The theoretical notion that the pursuit of a successful IT regime automatically
entails giving up any sort of control over the exchange rate has also been questioned
by empirical data. A recent controversial IMF working paper strongly contradicts the
theoretical literature and in fact that argues that proper management of the exchange
rate actually enhances the results and efficacy of IT in less developed countries
(Airaudo, Buffie, & Zanna, 2016). Building on the observation that foreign currency
still carries significant weight as a supplier of liquidity services in less developed
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countries, the authors concur that expectations of higher inflation can materialize in a
self-fulfilling manner once capital flight triggers rapid depreciation of the currency.
These empirical results point to a more neutral stance regarding the
importance of fulfilling the preconditions of IT. One can argue that the prerequisites
suggested in the theoretical framework should not be perceived as a rigid, stringent
set of conditions that must be fully satisfied before central banks can even approach
the prospect of IT adoption, rather, an amalgamation of circumstances that reduce the
costs associated with adopting an IT regime, and bolster the possibility and speed of
its success. For example, although the implementation of IT in Chile is considered to
have been essential to getting inflation under control, the low degree of fulfillment of
many of the necessary preconditions at the time of IT adoption resulted in Chile
converging to stationary inflation levels only after 36 quarters, which is six times as
long as the average time it takes developed economies to stabilize inflation levels
(Khalid, 2005). Similarly, the Colombian experience with IT targeting can be
regarded as a success in terms of macroeconomic performance today, but at the time
of IT adoption, fiscal mismanagement and the overall lack of fulfillment of
institutional prerequisites triggered one of the country’s longest recessions.
Thus, central banks of emerging or developed economies that are considering
a transition to an IT regime should not feel pressure to completely and fully satisfy all
theoretical IT preconditions before adoption, but they should systematically assess the
stance of the economy with regards to achieving these conditions, acknowledge them
as important determinants of success, and subsequently work to make significant
progress in the lacking areas during the introduction and implementation of an IT
regime.
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3. Recent Developments of Monetary Policy in Egypt
For the purpose of analysis, this section divides the evolution of monetary policy
in Egypt since 1990 till the present into four distinct phases. The end of one phase
(and the start of the next) is determined by a major, relevant event that I find to be a
defining incident in monetary policy evolution in Egypt. These four phases are:
Phase One: The Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP)
until the Transition to a Managed Float of the Exchange Rate (1990-2004)
Phase Two: The Adoption of a New Monetary Policy in 2005 (2005-2011)
Phase Three: The January 2011 Revolution Onwards (2011- 2016)
Phase Four: Liberalization of the Exchange Rate Onwards (November 2016 –
Present)

Phase One: The ERSAP until the Transition to a Managed Float of the
Exchange Rate (1990-2004)
Prior to 1990, the Central Bank of Egypt set limits on bank borrowing and
lending interest rates that were below the inflation rate during that period. This was
representative of the overall subjugated nature of the banking system in Egypt at the
time. In general, growth of money circulating in the economy was driven by the
government’s needs for finance, and preferential borrowing rates were given to public
firms and establishments (Handy, 2001).
In the early 1990’s, in line with Egypt’s Economic Reform and Structural
Adjustment Program (ERSAP), the Central Bank took steps towards reforming the
banking sector and giving more weight to market forces in the distribution of credit
and in the conduct of monetary policy. Direct credit ceilings that had previously been
in place were gradually replaced with the development of indirect tools. The
limitations on bank deposit and lending rates and on credit to the private sector were
removed in 1991 (Moursi, Mossallamy, & Zakareya, 2007). Thus, the Central Bank
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began a move towards the use of indirect monetary policy instruments for the conduct
of monetary policy. Instead of directly limiting credit expansion in the banking sector,
the Central Bank hosted weekly auctions of treasury bills with a maturity of three
months (longer maturities were introduced subsequently). It thus managed liquidity
growth indirectly through the purchase and sale of treasury bills. The reforms put in
place under the ERSAP were successful in bringing inflation down from an annual
average of over 20% between 1986 and 1992 to less than 10% by 1997. Inflation
levels remained at single digits until the end of 2001 (Al-mashat, 2008).
In spite of the progress made in the liberalization of the banking system and
monetary policy during the ERSAP, there still remained the challenge of selection of
a single, ultimate objective for the CBE, rather than multiple, often conflicting ones.
Indeed, the period between the introduction of the ERSAP in 1990 and the float of the
Egyptian pound in January 2003 was a period of obscurity in terms of the CBE’s
objectives (Awad, 2005). At the time, the CBE was targeting high economic growth,
while at the same time attempting to contain inflation with a pegged exchange rate,
which presented a dilemma for the conduct of monetary policy (Awad, 2005). Growth
of M2 was the intermediate target for the Central Bank, while its operational target
was the excess reserves of banks up until 2005 (Abou El-Eyoun, 2003).
In January of 2003, the CBE announced it would transition from a crawling
peg exchange rate regime to a managed float. The decision was regarded as an
attempt to relieve pressure on international reserves, and bring more consistency to
monetary policy by allowing the exchange rate to be more flexible (Galal, 2003).
With the first attempt to float the exchange rate in January 2003, the exchange rate
pass through (ERPT) effects of the subsequent depreciation of the pound caused
inflation to skyrocket once again, reaching a peak of 21.7% in early 2004.
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Additionally, the CBE continued to cite exchange rate stability as one of the key
objectives of monetary policy throughout 2004 and 2005 despite the official
announcement to float the exchange rate (Awad, 2005). The volatility of excess
reserves (Al-mashat, 2008), the inconsistency in monetary policy management and
the existence of multiple targets for monetary policy were all factors in the Central
Bank’s decision to transition towards a new monetary policy framework of IT in June
2005.

Phase Two: The Adoption of a New Monetary Policy in 2005 (20052011)
With the CBE’s announcement of its decision to transition towards an IT
regime whenever the fundamental prerequisites were achieved, changes were made to
the framework governing monetary policy in Egypt. Towards the ultimate objective
of low and stable inflation, the intermediate target would be growth of money supply
and the Central Bank would also monitor developments in the inflation forecast and
domestic liquidity. The overnight interbank rate, which is a price target, would take
the place of excess reserves (a quantitative target) as the CBE’s operational target.
The Central Bank would set the overnight lending facility (the ceiling) and overnight
deposit facility (the floor), which together form the overnight interbank corridor,
within which the interbank rate fluctuates (Monetary Policy Department, 2015). As
the effect of the devaluation of the pound started to wear off, and with the Central
Bank’s attempts to contain inflation with tighter monetary policy, inflation levels fell
during the second half of 2004 and throughout 2005 (Al-mashat, 2011).
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Figure 1: Overnight Interbank and CBE Corridor Rates (2001-2010)
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Due to the second round effects of supply shocks due to oil subsidy cuts and
the spread of bird flu, inflation picked up in 2006, increasing gradually from 9.6% in
annual CPI in September 2006 to 12.4% in December 2006 to 12.8% in March 2007.
As a result, the CBE continued its efforts towards achieving price stability leveraging
the operational target of the overnight interbank rate, which was reflected in the
MPC’s decision to raise the overnight lending and deposit rates by 0.5% in November
and again by 0.25% in December 2006 to reach 8.50% and 10.50% in November and
8.75% and 10.75% in December 2006 respectively. Inflationary pressures were eased
as the annual CPI inflation rate declined to 8.5% in June 2007. During the same
period, the CBE attempted to absorb excess liquidity in the market as a result of
higher foreign direct investment flows by reactivating deposit auctions in January
2007, and using its certificates of deposits (CDs) and notes.
Inflation remained under control for the remainder of the financial year, and
the CBE’s policy rates were stabilized accordingly. However, during the second
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quarter of FY 2007/08, the CBE was faced with soaring inflation rates once again due
to a surge in global food prices towards the end of 2007, an adjustment in subsidized
oil and gas products, and accelerating economic growth. Annual CPI accelerated to
reach 19.7% in May, 20.2% in June 2008 and 21.5% in September 2008. In
anticipation of higher inflation expectations, the MPC made several subsequent
decisions to increase the policy rate during the period between February and
September 2008, bringing the overnight deposit and lending rates up to 11.5% and
13.5% respectively by the end of September 2008. Furthermore, attempts to control
excess liquidity were starting to pay off, with the annual growth in M2 decelerating to
15.7% in 2007/2008, down from 18.3% in 2006/2007.
Figure 2: Annual Growth in M1 and M2
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Egypt’s economy was considered generally resilient to the effects of the global
financial crisis during 2008, and by the end of the first half of 2009, inflation was
brought down to single digits once again, reaching 9.9% in June 2009, down from
20.2% during the same month one year before. The MPC thus decreased the CBE’s
policy rate in an attempt to stimulate investment and growth once inflation was down
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to moderate levels. At the same time, the width of the corridor was narrowed from 2%
to 1.5%, bringing the overnight deposit and lending rates down to 9% and 10.5%
respectively in June 2009. Towards the end of the year, policy rates were lowered
twice in simultaneous MPC meetings to reach 8.25% and 9.75% in September 2009.
With the construction of a suitable price index being a core technical prerequisite of
an IT framework, in October 2009, the CBE prepared a measure of core CPI that
excluded regulated goods, and hence the impact of temporary price shocks on
inflation. The purpose of this indicator was to provide a complementary indicator to
headline CPI that would help to separate the core trend of inflation and its transitory
movements, to depict a more accurate picture of the dynamics of inflation.
In general, inflation remained manageable and stable from the second half of
2009 until mid-2010, with an average headline CPI of 11.5%, prompting the CBE to
stabilize policy rates throughout that period.

Phase Three: The January 2011 Revolution Onwards (2011- 2016)
In response to the economic instability that followed the events of January
2011, and its impact on financial markets and liquidity, the CBE introduced weekly
repo operations with a maturity of one week at an interest rate to be set on a regular
basis by the MPC to address the liquidity crisis in the banking sector. The interest on
7-day repo operations was first set at 9.25% annually, and then later increased to
9.75% in November of the same year. While previous years had witnessed the
weighted average overnight interbank rate consistently gravitating towards the deposit
rate as a result of the excess liquidity in the banking sector, the beginning of 2011
witnessed the interbank rate hovering towards the middle of the corridor in response
to the liquidity crisis.
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Annual headline CPI picked up to 11.8% in June 2011 up from 10.1% in June
2010. Additionally the appreciation of the US dollar in relation to the Egyptian pound
led to a rise in import costs. The political instability that shook the country earlier that
year had led to local supply bottlenecks and shortages and weak demand, both of
which contributed to expectations of higher inflation. In November of 2011, the MPC
increased the deposit and lending rates by 100 bps and 50 bps to reach 9.25% and
10.25% respectively, thereby narrowing the width of the corridor once again to 1%.
The decision to increase the key policy rates was backed by the MPC’s desire to
hedge the aforementioned inflationary pressures.
More efforts were made by the Board of Directors of the CBE in 2012 to
address the lack of liquidity in the money market as the effects of the events of 2011
continued to take their toll on the economy. These include reducing the required
reserve ratio (RRR) from 14% to 12% in March (and later to 10% in May), and the
introduction of repo operations with a maturity of 28 days in July. Eventually, the
decisions taken by the CBE started to bear fruit, whereby the liquidity deficit in the
banking system shrunk until it eventually turned into a surplus during the second half
of 2012.
During FY 2011/2012, the annual headline CPI (urban) moderated to 7.3% in
June 2012, on the back of lower prices of food and non-alcoholic beverages. During
the second half of 2013 and the first half of 2014, the MPC decided in three
consecutive meetings to lower the overnight lending and deposit rates by a total of
150 bps till they stabilized at 8.25% and 9.25% respectively. These rates were
maintained until July 2014, but were then increased by 100 bps in response to the
government’s revision of the prices of several regulated items in the CPI basket,
which pushed inflation up. At this point, inflation was at a moderate level, with
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headline CPI recording 8.2% in June 2014, however, the government’s overall fiscal
consolidation effort carried an inflationary effect was inevitable, and the MPC thus
embarked on a series of “preemptive rate hikes” to limit the associated inflationary
effects. Additionally, to absorb the excess surge in liquidity in the banking sector, the
CBE continued its bank deposit acceptance operations, using the seven-day deposit
auctions that had been introduced in mid-2013. In December 2015, the MPC started
the first of what would be a long series of consistent hikes in policy rates to contain
inflation expectations in support of the government’s fiscal consolidation program.
Thus, between December 2015 and June 2016, policy rates were increased by 3% to
curb the continuous rise in both annual headline and core inflation, which had reached
13.97% and 12.37% respectively by the end of June 2016.

Figure 3: Overnight Interbank and CBE Corridor Rates (2011-2015)
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Phase Four: Liberalization of the Exchange Rate Onwards (November
2016 – Present)
The decision to liberalize the exchange rate on November 3rd 2016 was a
critical one taken by the CBE amidst a broader reform agenda to restore
macroeconomic stability to the country. Egypt initiated a new economic and structural
reform program supported by the Extended Fund Facility from the IMF in November
2016. The main objectives of the program include (1) eliminating foreign exchange
shortages to encourage investment and exports, (2) developing a monetary policy
framework aimed at getting inflation under control, (3) consolidating the fiscal deficit
and ensuring sustainability of pubic debt, and (4) undergoing structural reforms that
promote higher and more inclusive growth. The decision to float the pound was
backed by the authorities’ plan to bring foreign exchange trade back to formal
channels and away from the black market, and to improve the competitiveness of
Egyptian exports and build up reserves while simultaneously reducing exports.
Nonetheless, the exchange rate pass through (ERPT) effects, as well as the transitory
effects of such a decision were expected to significantly take a toll on inflation rates,
and so the MPC increased policy rates by 300 bps again in concurrence with the
liberalization of the exchange right to reach 14.75% for the overnight deposit rate and
15.75% for the overnight lending rate in November 2016.
The prices of more than half of the items of the CPI basket were significantly
impacted by the exchange rate reform measures in 2016. This transitory cost-push
effect, along with inflation expectations linked to a history of inflation hovering
around 10%, were the main drivers of the skyrocketing inflation that was registered
towards the end of 2016, with headline and core CPI reaching 23.3% and 25.9% by
the end of the year. Other factors included the introduction of the value-added tax
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(VAT) at a higher rate than its predecessor (the general sales tax), and further fiscal
consolidation measures including the gradual removal of subsidies on certain items.
Figure 4: Exchange Rate vs. Inflation Evolution (2005-2018)
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Throughout 2017, the situation with regards to inflation was to deteriorate
before it got better. By July of 2017, headline CPI had reached its peak of 33%. The
MPC tightened its interest rate stance even further by raising policy rates another 700
bps between the date the exchange rate was liberalized and July 2017, placing the
overnight deposit rate at 18.75% and the overnight lending rate at 19.75%. Moreover,
the CBE and the Ministry of Finance agreed to gradually phase out monetary
financing of the fiscal deficit and abide by the legal limits to limit fiscal dominance.
The CBE further tightened conditions via the introduction of flexible rate auctions to
absorb excess liquidity over maturities greater than 7 days.
In March of 2017, the CBE also published its first “Monetary Policy Report”,
a step that symbolized a commitment to enhanced transparency and communication
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with the public in the conduct of monetary policy. The CBE announced its intention
to publish the report on a quarterly basis. Additionally, in May 2017, the CBE
announce an explicit inflation target of 13% (+/-3%) to be achieved by the fourth
quarter of 2018.
M2 growth (excluding revaluation) averaged 20.4% between November 2016
and May 2017 compared to 15.9% between July and October 2016, owing largely to
the positive contribution of net foreign assets to the banking system for the first time
since 2011. To supplement these decisions, the CBE also took measures to sterilize
excess liquidity by decelerating the growth of monetary aggregates, and particularly
by targeting shorter-term maturity instruments. To that extent, the CBE was
successful in reducing excess liquidity in maturities less than or equal to seven days
from 3.5% of GDP in November 2016 to 0.6% in June 2017. The weighted average
overnight interbank rate gravitated towards the ceiling of the corridor, reflecting these
developments.
Figure 5: Overnight Rates Since January 2016
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Source: Ministry of Finance, Central Bank of Egypt
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Figure 6: Headline and Core CPI (y/y) in Egypt
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The following table depicts the weight of items in the CPI basket, as
determined by the household income and expenditure survey of 2010 (January 2010 =
100%), and trends in the prices of its components between June 2011 and June 2017.
The largest percentage change was an increase of 160.8% in culture and recreation,
followed by an increase of 152.8% and 150.6% for alcoholic beverages and tobacco,
and food and non-alcoholic beverages respectively. Unsurprisingly, the smallest
positive percentage change was in housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels, due
to the subsidies on many of these items that were only partially and gradually
removed during the end of the period.
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Table 1: Changes in Major CPI Component Prices
Relative
Weights
100.0

All Items
Annual Growth Rate
Food & Non- Alcoholic
Beverages
Annual Growth Rate

39.9

Alcoholic
Beverages,
Tobacco & Narcotics

2.2

Annual Growth Rate
Clothing & Footwear
Annual Growth Rate
Housing,
Water,
Electricity, Gas & Other
Fuel
Annual Growth Rate
Furnishings,
Household Equipment
Annual Growth Rate
Health

5.4

18.4

3.8
6.3

Annual Growth Rate
Transport

5.7

Annual Growth Rate
Communications

3.1

Annual Growth Rate
Culture & Recreation

2.4

Annual Growth Rate
Education

4.6

Annual Growth Rate
Restaurants& Hotels

4.4

Annual Growth Rate
Miscellaneous

3.7

Annual Growth Rate

June
2011
114.5

June
2012
122.8

June
2013
134.8

June
2014
145.9

June
2015
162.5

June
2016
185.2

June
2017
240.3

11.8

7.2

9.8

8.2

11.4

14.0

29.8

126.0

137.6

155.0

172.6

191.4

225.1

315.8

19.0

9.2

12.6

11.4

10.9

17.6

40.3

169.9

201.8

217.4

235.2

314.6

320.8

429.5

69.9

18.8

7.7

8.2

33.8

2.0

33.9

102.2

106.8

113.0

114.3

123.1

135.7

176.0

2.2

4.5

5.8

1.2

7.7

10.2

29.7

100.4

107.7

113.1

117.1

124.2

130.8

140.9

1.1

7.3

5.0

3.5

6.1

5.3

7.7

105.2

114.4

122.1

134.5

139.1

157.7

202.1

2.5

8.7

6.7

10.2

3.4

13.4

28.2

101.9

102.0

114.8

128.6

131.2

172.5

194.3

1.9

0.1

12.5

12.0

2.0

31.5

12.6

101.7

104.5

107.3

114.2

139.2

144.2

181.6

1.1

2.8

2.7

6.4

21.9

3.6

25.9

100.0

95.5

95.5

97.0

96.8

96.9

98.6

0.1

-4.5

0.0

1.6

-0.2

0.1

1.8

108.4

117.8

126.7

145.3

168.1

190.6

282.7

5.9

8.7

7.6

14.7

15.7

13.4

48.3

124.3

136.6

152.2

157.9

196.9

219.0

246.0

24.3

9.9

11.4

3.7

24.7

11.2

12.3

112.4

116.5

141.7

148.7

177.5

215.4

268.2

12.2

3.6

21.6

4.9

19.4

21.4

24.5

103.2

104.5

105.3

106.3

111.5

121.1

159.8

2.5

1.3

0.8

0.9

4.9

8.6

32.0

Source: Central Bank of Egypt

4. Testing for the Viability of an Inflation Targeting
Regime in Egypt
4.1 Methodology
A thorough review of the theoretical literature and empirical studies on the
applicability of inflation targeting provides a preliminary platform for the conduct of
a feasibility study of the implementation of inflation targeting in Egypt. The study
will attempt to tackle the question of whether or not inflation targeting should be
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% change
2011 - 2017
109.9
150.6

152.8

72.2

40.3

92.1
90.7
78.6
-1.4
160.8
97.9
138.6
54.8

adopted by the CBE given the current circumstances based on an assessment of the
institutional and technical framework currently in place in Egypt, and whether or not
this framework adequately satisfies the basic preconditions for inflation targeting. To
achieve this, this paper employs a twofold methodology divided into (1) the conduct
of a comprehensive survey of country practices and experiences with IT and (2) an
assessment of the Egyptian framework through a thorough review of the legislation
and institutional framework and an empirical assessment of the strength of the
relationship between monetary policy tools and inflation via a VAR methodology.
•

The comprehensive survey of the current international practices of 28
countries classified by the IMF as “inflation targeters” will be used to
identify the practical considerations that need to be taken into account if
the CBE indeed decides to adopt an inflation targeting regime.

•

This survey will be complemented by a thorough review of Egyptian
legislation, and the analysis of studies that have previously tackled the
areas of interest in the Egyptian context based on past practices. In
assessing the strength of the relationship between monetary policy tools
and inflation, a VAR model and subsequent Granger-causality tests are
employed. This analysis is extended to include impulse response functions
(IRF) for monetary policy tools and inflation, and variance decomposition
analysis.

4.2 Survey of Country Practices
The second part of my methodology involves carrying out a comprehensive
survey of the international experiences in the implementation of IT. This survey
covers the 28 countries that are currently classified by the IMF as fully-fledged
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inflation targeting economies as of today. 3 The major outcome of this extensive
review is a multi-dimensional summary table of inflation-targeting country practices
that could serve as a convenient, easy-to-access tool for evaluating on a practical basis
whether or not IT is suitable for Egypt, and where Egypt stands in the process of
fulfilling the institutional and technical

prerequisites for IT’s successful

implementation. Data sources that have been utilized extensively are the IMF
International Financial Statistics, the IMF Central Bank Legislation Database, and
country Central Bank websites and publications. To better understand the outcomes,
implementation challenges and considerations of inflation targeting in practice; the
survey will be aimed at depicting a comprehensive picture that includes an attempt to
answer the following questions:
•

How successful has inflation targeting been in terms of measurable
macroeconomic outcomes?

•

What entity is responsible for setting the inflation target? Is it the government,
the Central Bank, or is it set jointly?

•

How is the target defined? Is it a point or range target? If there is a range, how
small or large is the width of the range?

•

What measure of inflation is used (headline CPI, core CPI, or another index
altogether)?

•

What central bank accountability measures are in place? Are these
accountability measures informally practiced or does the law mandate them?

•

Does the legal framework prohibit or set limitations on central bank financing
of government deficit?

3

The 28 countries are: New Zealand, Canada, Australia, UK, Chile, Brazil, Mexico,
Czech Republic, Israel, Sweden, Guatemala, South Africa, Poland, Hungary,
Colombia, Thailand, Iceland, Korea, Indonesia, Romania, Serbia, Turkey, Armenia,
Albania, Ghana, Norway, Peru, and the Philippines.
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The IMF lists 28 economies as official inflation targeters. In general, inflationtargeting economies have been successful at driving inflation levels down, with the
average difference between the five-year average inflation rate after and before
implementation of IT being 10.28%. 4 The general trend also shows that these
countries have been successful in maintaining low and stable inflation, with the latest
inflation figures for most countries hovering around the five-year average after the
adoption of IT, with very few exceptions. The following graph depicts the average
inflation rates for inflation targeting economies in the five years before the adoption
of IT, versus the average of the five years after the adoption of IT (including the year
of adoption), and the latest inflation figures that were registered in 2016:

4

Brazil was excluded from this calculation and the subsequent graph due to it being
considered an outlier, with hyperinflation that averaged 721% in the five years before
IT adoption.
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Figure 7: IT Economies' Inflation Performance
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Additionally, a comparison between the average inflation rates of IT
economies and those that do not have in place an official IT regime shows that
inflation has been consistently lower in IT countries.
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Figure 8: Average Inflation Rate of IT vs. Non-IT Economies
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Source: IMF International Financial Statistics and data files.
Given the observed relative success of IT economies in managing their
ultimate goal of price stability, the logical next step would be to study individual
country practices in the setup of the IT framework. This segment of the analysis will
be particularly useful for studying the institutional framework, transparency and
accountability measures that need to be set in place to guarantee the proper
functioning of an IT regime. The amalgamation and analysis of experiences of other
countries will provide an invaluable tool with which policymakers may base their
planning of the upcoming transitional phase towards IT. Given the vast amount and
complexity of the information gathered, I contemplated that the best way to present it
in a clear and organized format would be through a comprehensive summary table.
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Comprehensive IT Country Practices Survey
Table 2: Comprehensive IT Country Practices Survey

Country

1. Albania

2.Armenia

Year of Current
IT
Target
Adoption

2009

2006

3% ± 1%

4%
(±1.5%)

Institutional
Responsibility
for Setting the
Target

Accountability Measures

The
Central
Bank - pursuant
to article 161 of
the Constitution
of the Republic
of Albania and
Law No. 8269
"On the Bank of
Albania"
(as
amended).

The Bank of Albania is legally obliged (as per
Article 2 of Law No. 8269 "On the Bank of
Albania") to report to the Assembly of the
Republic of Albania on monetary policy issues
twice a year. It should also give its opinion on
economic developments every three months.
The Bank of Albania sends its monetary policy
and decisions to the public through the
Monetary Policy Document, which describes
the key principles of the Bank of Albania's
monetary policy and the quarterly monetary
policy report that analyzes the economic,
monetary and financial developments that are
expected to affect future inflation. It is required
to convey its expectations to the public, and
explain the implications of monetary policy
decisions.
On a monthly basis, the Central Bank publishes
the Central Bank of Armenia bulletin, which
includes individual decisions of the CBA’s
voting members, as well as a statistical
supplement and minutes of the CBA Governing
Council meeting.
The quarterly Inflation Report - which the Bank
is legally required to publish, in accordance
with Article 17 of the Republic of Armenia
Law on the Central Bank - shows the state of
implementation
of
monetary
policy,
developments in inflation in the previous
quarter, domestic and external factors affecting
it, and the extent to which inflation target was
achieved.

The
Central
Bank
jointly
with
the
Government of
Armenia - as
stipulated
by
the Armenian
Law on State
Budget,
and
approved by the
National
Assembly
of
Armenia.
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Formal
Requirement
for
Explanation
of
Deviations?
No

Measure
Inflation
Used

of

Headline CPI

Is price stability
outlined as the
sole/overriding
objective in the
law?
Yes, in:
Law "On the Bank
of Albania"

No

Headline CPI

Yes, in:
Article 4 of the
Republic of the
Law on the Central
Bank of Armenia

Legal Framework Governing the
Institutional
Relationship
between CB and Government

Pursuant to Article 3 of Law No.
8269 "On the Bank of Albania",
the Bank of Albania may not grant
any direct, indirect or any financial
assistance to the Government of
the Republic of Albania or to any
of its Government agencies.
However, the Bank of Albania
may extend loans to the
Government of the Republic of
Albania with a maturity of six
months. The loan amount shall not
exceed the equivalent of 5% of the
annual average income of the
Government for the three financial
years immediately preceding the
loan approval.
In accordance with the law of the
Republic of Armenia concerning
the Central Bank, the Central Bank
is prohibited from providing any
direct or indirect credit or
financing
to
the
central
Government
or
to
other
government bodies.

Country

3.Australia

4.Brazil

Year of Current
IT
Target
Adoption

1993

1999

Between
2%
and
3%,
on
average,
over time.

For 2018:
4.50% with
a tolerance
interval of
1.50%5

Institutional
Responsibility
for Setting the
Target

Accountability Measures

The
Reserve
Bank
of
Australia jointly
with
the
Australian
Government –
stipulated in an
agreement
between
the
RBA and the
Australian
government and
published in the
"Statement of
Monetary
Policy
Management"
The
National
Monetary
Council
composed
of
the Minister of
Finance,
the
Minister
of
Planning, and
the Governor of
the
Central
Bank.

The RBA releases statements in which each
monetary policy decision is announced and
explained, and provides minutes giving
elaboration
on
the
Council's
policy
deliberations. It also comments on and analyzes
economic
prospects
through
regular
publications such as its quarterly Monetary
Policy Statement and Annual Report which it is
legally obliged to submit to the Treasurer as per
the “Public Governance, Performance and
Accountability Act” of 2013, for presentation to
the Parliament of Australia.
In addition, the Governor reports twice a year
to the Standing Committee on the Economy of
the House of Representatives and to other
parliamentary committees as appropriate.
The Brazilian Central Bank publishes its
Inflation Report quarterly, including charts and
graphs depicting the quantitative forecasts of
inflation and GDP, the schedule of future
monetary policy meetings, and minutes of
board meetings with a delay of less than one
week. As per Decree 3088, if the inflation
target is not met, the governor must submit an
open letter to the finance minister on the
reasons for the breach and the measures taken
to restore inflation to the target and the time
required.(“Inflation Targeting Regime in
Brazil,” 2016)

5 The target for 2019 is 4.25% ± 1.50%, and the target for 2020 is 4.00% ± 1.50%.
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Formal
Requirement
for
Explanation
of
Deviations?
No

Measure
Inflation
Used

of

Headline CPI

Is price stability
outlined as the
sole/overriding
objective in the
law?
Yes, in:
Article 2, Section
10 of the Reserve
Bank Act of 1959
as amended.

Yes

IPCA (Broad
National
Consumer
Price Index)

Yes, in
Decree No. 3088
issued
by
the
President of the
Republic in 1999

Legal Framework Governing the
Institutional
Relationship
between CB and Government

There is no legislation on
restrictions on the provision of
credit from the RBA to the
government.

According to Article 164 of the
Brazilian Constitution, the Central
Bank is prohibited from granting
loans, either directly or indirectly,
to the National Treasury and to
any body or agency that is not a
financial institution.

Country

5.Canada

6.Chile

Year of Current
IT
Target
Adoption

1991

1999

Institutional
Responsibility
for Setting the
Target

Accountability Measures

2%
midpoint of
a
target
range
of
1% to 3%
over
the
medium
term.

Jointly between
Bank of Canada
and
the
government, in
a
joint
agreement
between
the
Bank of Canada
and
the
Government of
Canada
“Renewal of the
InflationControl Target October 2016”

The Monetary Policy Report is published
quarterly, and indicates the Bank’s projections
for inflation, in addition to the major risks that
could cause inflation to deviate from its target.
The “Renewal of the Inflation-Control Target”
issued in May 2001, states that ‘If CPI inflation
persistently deviates from the 2% target
midpoint, the Bank will give special attention in
its Monetary Policy Reports or Updates to
explaining why inflation has deviated to such
an extent from the target midpoint, what steps
are being taken to ensure that inflation moves
back to this midpoint, and when inflation is
expected to return to the midpoint.’

3% ± 1%

Central Bank

Policy decisions are announced to the public
immediately after the respective monetary
policy meeting in an official news release. The
central bank publishes the inflation report three
times a year, announces the dates of the
monthly monetary policy meeting six months in
advance, and reveals the minutes of the
meetings of the Monetary Policy Committee
with a delay of three weeks. The Central Bank
of Chile, pursuant to sections 78-80 of the
Basic Constitutional Act on Central Bank of
Chile, is required to submit an annual report
evaluating the effectiveness of monetary policy
to the Minister of Finance and to the Senate and
to make said report available to the public.

52

Formal
Requirement
for
Explanation
of
Deviations?
Yes

Measure
Inflation
Used

of

Total CPI

Is price stability
outlined as the
sole/overriding
objective in the
law?
Yes, in
The
joint
agreement between
the Bank of Canada
and
the
Government
of
Canada of 1991

No

Headline CPI

Yes, in
Section 3 in Basic
Constitutional Act
on Bank of Chile

Legal Framework Governing the
Institutional
Relationship
between CB and Government

According to Article 18 of the
Bank of Canada Act, the Bank of
Canada is allowed to “make loans
or advances for periods not
exceeding six months to the
Government of Canada, but such
loans outstanding at any one time
shall not, in the case of the
Government of Canada, exceed
one-third of the estimated revenue
of the Government of Canada for
its fiscal year...and such loans shall
be repaid before the end of the first
quarter after the end of the fiscal
year of the government that has
contracted the loan”
According to Article 109 of the
Constitution of the Republic of
Chile 1980 and Section 27 of the
Basic Constitutional Act on the
Central Bank of Chile, the Central
Bank may not act as a collateral or
secure documents issued by the
State, its bodies or institutions.
The Central Bank is forbidden
from providing credit through
direct or indirect means to finance
public expenditure or loans to the
Government.

Country

7.Colombia

8.Czech
Republic

Year of Current
IT
Target
Adoption

1999

1998

Institutional
Responsibility
for Setting the
Target

Accountability Measures

Between
2%
and
4%, with
3% as a
specific
goal

The Board of
Directors of the
Central Bank of
Colombia 6 in
accordance with
the Law of
Congress No.
31 of 1992 on
the Bank of the
Republic
of
Colombia

In accordance with Law of Congress No. 31 of
1992 on the Bank of the Republic of Colombia,
the Board of Directors of the Bank of the
Republic of Colombia reports twice a year to
Congress on the performance and prospects of
the economy. Monetary policy decisions are
announced after Board meetings. This is done
in a press release published on the website of
the Bank of the Republic of Colombia. The
inflation report, which is intended to give
transparency to the Council's decisions, is
published quarterly.

2% (with a
tolerance
band of ±
1%)

Central
Bank
(after reaching a
consensus with
the
government)

The Czech National Bank publishes quarterly
inflation reports, explaining to the public its
views on past and future economic and
monetary developments, and on monetary
policy decisions. The report also includes
minutes of the board meeting of the Czech
National Bank. Starting from 2001, the minutes
have been expanded to include the votes on
interest rate decisions by member name, as well
as “Situation Reports on Economic and
Monetary Developments”, which are described
as the “main reference material for the Board’s
monetary policy discussions”. (Czech National
Bank, 2007)

Formal
Requirement
for
Explanation
of
Deviations?
No

Measure
Inflation
Used

Headline CPI

Is price stability
outlined as the
sole/overriding
objective in the
law?
Yes, in
Decree No. 2520 of
1993 concerning
the Central Bank of
Colombia, and
Law of Congress
No. 31 of 1992 on
the Republic of
Colombia

No

Headline CPI

6 It is worth mentioning that the Minister of Finance is the “presiding member” of the Board of Directors of the Central Bank of Colombia.
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of

Yes, in
Article 98 of the
Constitution of the
Czech
Republic
and in Article 2 of
Act No. 6/1993
Coll., on the Czech
National Bank

Legal Framework Governing the
Institutional
Relationship
between CB and Government

According to the Constitution of
1991 and its amendments, the
Central Bank is prohibited from
extending
credit
to
the
Government,
except
under
“previously
foreseen,
special
circumstances”. Under normal
circumstances, the Bank can only
extend
credit
to
financial
intermediaries
that
are
experiencing temporary problems
of liquidity or shortage of
resources.
In accordance with Article 34 of
the Act on the Czech National
Bank, the Czech National Bank is
prohibited from offering overdraft
facilities or any other type of credit
facilities or from buying debt
instruments directly from other
European
Union
institutions,
entities, central or regional
governments, local authorities or
other bodies governed by it Public
Law. (Act No. 6 /1993, on the
Czech National Bank, as amended,
2017).

Country

9.Ghana

10.Guatemala

Year of Current
IT
Target
Adoption

2007

2005

8% ± 2%

4% ±1%

Institutional
Responsibility
for Setting the
Target

Accountability Measures

Jointly by the
Central
Bank
and
the
Government in
the
annual
budget
statement.

Although minutes of MPC meetings are not
published, the minutes of the press briefing are
posted on the bank's website within a week of
the MPC meeting. The World Economic
Outlook, the External Sector Report, the
Monetary and Financial Developments Report,
the Financial Stability Report, the Real Sector
Developments Report and the Inflation Forecast
and Analysis Report are published.
Although the bank is not legally bound to
explain why the target inflation rate is not met,
the Governor of the Bank of Ghana can be
called to the Finance Committee of Parliament
to explain developments within the economy
when necessary.
The new Central Bank Law states that its
governor must appear twice a year to report to
the Congress on the progress of monetary
policy and the achievement (or lack thereof) of
policy objectives.
The Bank should also publish every six months
a monetary policy report explaining the actions
taken to achieve its objectives.
The Central Bank should publish an annual
study of monetary policy and the monetary
program approved by the Board of Directors.
The minutes of the Board involving the
formulation of monetary policy must also be
published.

Board
of
Directors of the
Central Bank in
accordance with
the
new
Organic Law of
the Bank of
Guatemala,
2002
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Formal
Requirement
for
Explanation
of
Deviations?
No

Measure
Inflation
Used

of

Headline CPI

Is price stability
outlined as the
sole/overriding
objective in the
law?
Yes, in
Act on the Bank of
Ghana (Act No.
612) in 2002

No

Headline CPI

Yes, in
Article 3 of the
Decree
Number
16-2002 of the
Congress of the
Republic
of
Guatemala,
Organic Law of the
Bank
of
Guatemala.

Legal Framework Governing the
Institutional
Relationship
between CB and Government

In accordance with the Bank of
Ghana Act 2002, the Bank may
provide advance loans to the
Government for overdrafts and
may directly purchase from the
Government treasury bills and
securities
representing
the
Government's obligations. Loans,
advances and purchase of treasury
bills and securities with funds
borrowed by the Government shall
not exceed 10% of the total
income of the fiscal year in which
the advances were made.
In accordance with Guatemala's
Constitution,
the
Monetary
Council may not authorize the
Bank of Guatemala to grant direct
or indirect financing, guarantees or
approvals to the State or its
decentralized
or
independent
entities or to private entities not
involved in the banking sector.
Furthermore,
the
Bank
of
Guatemala cannot obtain securities
issued or negotiated by these
entities in the primary market.

Country

11.Hungary

12.Iceland

Year of Current
IT
Target
Adoption

2001

2001

3 % ±1%

2.5%

Institutional
Responsibility
for Setting the
Target

Accountability Measures

The
Magyar
Nemzeti Bank
(MNB),
in
accordance with
Act on the
Magyar
Nemzeti Bank,
20137

Minutes of the MPC’s meetings are released
before subsequent meetings take place, and the
MPC issues a statement explaining the reasons
behind its action on the day of the interest rate
decision. Individual votes are also published.
The MNB publishes its inflation report on a
quarterly basis. The Bank’s performance in
achieving the inflation target is assessed on an
annual basis in the Annual Report and Financial
Stability Report.
The Act on the Central Bank of mandates the
publishing of the MPC meeting minutes with a
formal explanation of the rationale behind them
two weeks after each meeting. The minutes
contain the members’ reasons for their votes.
The individual votes of MPC members are
made public in the Bank’s Annual Report. As
per the Declaration of the Prime Minister and
the Governors of the Central Bank of Iceland
(2001), if inflation deflects its target by more
than 1.5% in either direction, the bank must
submit a public report to the government
explaining why inflation has moved from the
target, and the policy measures it is taking to
deal with it, as well as the period that the MPC
expects inflation to return to the target. The
governors will also report to the Minister,
Government and Parliamentary Committees on
the Bank's policy.

Jointly by the
Central
Bank
and
the
Government of
Iceland in a
joint
declaration, in
accordance with
the law of the
Central Bank of
Iceland No. 36
of 2001

Formal
Requirement
for
Explanation
of
Deviations?
No

of

Headline CPI

Is price stability
outlined as the
sole/overriding
objective in the
law?
Yes, in
Article 3 of Act of
2013 on MNB

Yes

7 The target is set in agreement with the Government of Hungary, although the Hungarian law does not mandate this.

55

Measure
Inflation
Used

Headline CPI

Yes, in
Article 3 of Act on
the Central Bank of
Iceland

Legal Framework Governing the
Institutional
Relationship
between CB and Government

In accordance with the law of the
Hungarian National Bank, the
Bank may not extend overdraft
facilities or any other type of credit
facilities to, and may not purchase
debt instruments directly from the
public sector as defined in article
123 of the Treaty on the Conduct
of the Business of the European
Union.
According to Article 16 of the Act
on the Central Bank, the Central
Bank of Iceland may not grant
credit to the National Treasury,
municipalities or government
institutions other than credit
institutions.

Country

13.Indonesia

Year of Current
IT
Target
Adoption

2005

3.5% ±1%
for 2018

Institutional
Responsibility
for Setting the
Target

Accountability Measures

Government 8 –
as stipulated in
a Memorandum
of
Understanding
between
the
Government
and
Bank
Indonesia and
published
by
Decree of the
Minister
of
Finance
(KMK).

Bank Indonesia regularly reports to the
Indonesian Parliament on monetary policy as
part of the Bank's accountability for performing
the functions and functions guaranteed by law.
Monetary policy is reported through written
notes and verbal explanations of monetary
policy every quarter, and specific aspects of
monetary policy as it deems necessary. In
addition, the policy accountability report is
submitted to the Government and made
available to the public for transparency and
coordination.
If inflation is not met during the year, the Bank
of Indonesia will provide an open explanation
of why the government and Bank of Indonesia's
objectives have not been met jointly by the
Indonesian parliament and the public.

Formal
Requirement
for
Explanation
of
Deviations?
Yes

Measure
Inflation
Used

of

Headline CPI

Is price stability
outlined as the
sole/overriding
objective in the
law?
Yes, in
Act No. 23 of
1999 concerning
Bank Indonesia

Legal Framework Governing the
Institutional
Relationship
between CB and Government

The 1999 Law of the Republic of
Indonesia on Bank Indonesia states
that Bank Indonesia will not
provide any credit to the
Government and is prohibited
from buying the State's debt.

8 Before Act No. 23 of 1999 concerning Bank Indonesia, the inflation target was set by Bank Indonesia. However, the Act stipulates that the inflation target is set by the Government in a move

to strengthen the credibility of Bank Indonesia.
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Country

14.Israel

15.Mexico

Year of Current
IT
Target
Adoption

1997

2001

Between 13%

3% ± 1%

Institutional
Responsibility
for Setting the
Target

Accountability Measures

Set
by
the
Government of
Israel
(in
consultation
with the Bank
of
Israel
Governor) – as
stipulated
by
Article 3b of
Bank of Israel
Law of 2010

According to Article 55 of the Bank of Israel
Law, the Monetary Committee and the Finance
Committee of the Bank of Israel shall submit at
least twice a year a report on monetary policy.
The report includes the policies that the MPC
considers necessary to maintain price stability
within the range set by the Government.
Reports are issued one month after the end of
each half-year.
Also according to the law: “If the inflation rate
deviates, during six consecutive months, from
the range determined by the Government as per
Section 3(b), said periodic report shall include
details about the reasons for the deviation, the
policy that the Committee has adopted to
readjust the inflation rate to the determined
range, and the Committee’s estimate of the
period of time required for the attainment of
this result”.
Banco De Mexico publishes its quarterly
Inflation Report, which analyzes inflation
expectations, monetary policy, and future
inflation risk balance. The Bank is required to
report on its policies and activities to Congress.
In line with this practice, the Bank of Mexico in
January sends both the President and Congress
a document setting out monetary policy to be
followed for that year and a source of monetary
policy implementation during the first half of
this year. In addition, the Bank of Mexico sends
to Congress a quarterly report on the evolution
of Mexico's inflation and economy, as well as
various domestic economic indicators.

Banco
De
Mexico – as
stipulated
by
Banco
De
Mexico Law as
amended

57

Formal
Requirement
for
Explanation
of
Deviations?
Yes

Measure
Inflation
Used

of

Headline CPI
(Ribon, 2009)

Is price stability
outlined as the
sole/overriding
objective in the
law?
Yes
Article 2 of Bank
of Israel Law,
5770-2010

No

Headline CPI

Yes, in
Article 2 of Banco
De Mexico Law

Legal Framework Governing the
Institutional
Relationship
between CB and Government

According to Chapter 8 of the
Bank of Israel Law: “The Bank
may not provide a loan to the
Government to finance its
expenditure. However, the Bank
may provide the Government with
a temporary advance to fill the
temporary
gaps
in
the
Government's cash flow in
implementing the budget, provided
that the total provisional advances
at any time does not exceed 1.6%
of the total annual budget amounts
at that time.”

In accordance with article 7 of the
Banco De Mexico Law of 1993,
the Bank of Mexico is entitled to
grant credit to the Federal
Government along with credit
institutions.

Country

16.New
Zealand

17.Norway

Year of Current
IT
Target
Adoption

1990

2001

Between
1% - 3%
over
the
medium
term (with
a focus on
maintainin
g inflation
near
the
2% target
midpoint.)

About
2.5% over
time.

Institutional
Responsibility
for Setting the
Target

Accountability Measures

Jointly between
the Minister of
Finance and the
Governor of the
Reserve Bank
of New Zealand
(RBNZ) – as
stipulated
by
the Law of the
Reserve Bank
of
New
Zealand,
and
published in the
Policy Targets
Agreement.
The
Government of
Norway - in
accordance with
the
Royal
Decree of 2001.

The Law of the RBNZ states that the Bank shall
publish the Monetary Policy Statement at least
every six months; there shall be a select
committee of the parliament whose task is to
review the bank's monetary policy statement
and to review the implementation of the
monetary policy; that the non-executive
members of the BoD of the RNBZ will be
tasked with reviewing the performance of the
governor in relation to the declared monetary
policy, and submitting a report to the Minister
of Finance, who may dismiss the Governor of
the Central Bank in the event of failure to
achieve the agreed upon inflation targets – even
if only for one quarter.
The Bank of Norway is required by law to
submit a monetary policy report three times a
year with the announcement of the interest rate
decision and to submit the annual report on the
implementation of monetary policy. Whenever
inflation is outside the target range, the central
bank provides a comprehensive assessment in
its annual report explaining the reasons behind
the breakthrough and the next steps to reach the
declared inflation target again. Special
emphasis will be placed on any deviations
greater than ± 1%.
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Formal
Requirement
for
Explanation
of
Deviations?
Yes

Measure
Inflation
Used

of

Headline CPI

Is price stability
outlined as the
sole/overriding
objective in the
law?
Yes, in
Section 8 of the
Reserve Bank of
New Zealand Act
1989.

Yes

Headline CPI

Yes, in
Ministry
of
Finance Letter of
2001 on Monetary
Policy Guidelines
pursuant to section
2 and section 4 of
the
Bank
of
Norway Act 1985.

Legal Framework Governing the
Institutional
Relationship
between CB and Government

There is no legislation on
restrictions on the provision of
credit from the central bank to the
government

According to the Bank of Norway
Act 1985, the bank may not
provide credit directly or indirectly
to the government.

Country

18.Peru

Year of Current
IT
Target
Adoption

2002

19.Philippines 2002

2% ± 1%

3٪ ± 1٪
over
the
medium
term

Institutional
Responsibility
for Setting the
Target

Accountability Measures

Central Reserve
Bank of Peru
(BRCP)

The BCRP publishes an Inflation Report every
four months. In addition to analyzing the recent
evolution of inflation and the actions adopted
by the Central Bank, as well as the Bank’s
vision on the evolution of economic variables
and on how they might influence on inflation’s
future trend, it also examines the main factors
that could deviate inflation one way or another.
Monthly press releases on the monetary
program for the month are usually based on the
Inflation Report or refer to it.

Government
sets the target
and
it
is
approved by the
Development
Budget
Coordination
Committee
(DBCC)
through
its
Resolutions
(most recently
in 2015).

The Inflation Report is published every three
months. According to Section 40 of the New
Central Bank Act, the Bangko Sentral must
publish its annual report indicating the degree
to which monetary policy objectives have been
achieved and the underlying causes which will
be submitted to the President and to Congress.
When the inflation target is not met, an open
letter is sent to the President and the general
public that determines the reasons for not
achieving the inflation target, and future actions
to be taken to restore inflation to the target as
set out in Section 63 of the new Central Bank
Act 7653.
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Formal
Requirement
for
Explanation
of
Deviations?
No

Yes

Measure
Inflation
Used

of

Is price stability
outlined as the
sole/overriding
objective in the
law?

Consumer
Price Index
for
Metropolitan
Lima

Yes, in

Headline CPI

Yes, in

Article
2
of
Organic Law of the
Central
Reserve
Bank of Peru

Republic Act: New
Central Bank Act
7653

Legal Framework Governing the
Institutional
Relationship
between CB and Government

According to Article 77 of the
Organic Law of the Central
Reserve Bank of Peru, excluding
securities in the secondary market
issued by the Treasury, the Bank
may not grant funding to the
Treasury. It also prohibits the
financing
of
state-owned
promotional financial institutions.

There is no legislation on
restrictions on the provision of
credit from the central bank to the
government.

Country

Year of Current
IT
Target
Adoption

20.Poland

1998

21.Romania

2005

Institutional
Responsibility
for Setting the
Target

Accountability Measures

2.5% ± 1%
over
the
medium
term

Narodowy
Bank Polski’s
(NBP)
Monetary
Policy Council9
- under Article
12 of the Act on
the NBP.

2.5% ± 1%

Jointly between
the
National
Bank
of
Romania
and
the Government
of Romania10

Short-term inflation targets (one year) and
medium-term targets (six years) are announced.
The NBP publishes its inflation reports on a
quarterly basis, which contain an assessment of
inflationary processes and determinants of
inflation, and elaboration of the monetary
policy conduct during the last three months.
The NBP also publishes the individual voting
records of the members of the MPC. The
MPC's decisions are published in press releases
and accompanying press conferences, as well as
the MPC minutes of meetings, the NBP’s
monetary policy guidelines and the Monetary
Policy Implementation Report.
The Inflation Report is published on a quarterly
basis and it includes the following sections:
Inflation
developments;
Economic
developments; Monetary policy and financial
developments; Inflation outlook, uncertainties
and risks, implications on monetary stance.
Developments in key statistical indicators are
analyzed in detail in the monthly, semi-annual
(Financial Stability Reports) and the annual
reports.

9

Formal
Requirement
for
Explanation
of
Deviations?
No

Measure
Inflation
Used

of

Headline CPI

Is price stability
outlined as the
sole/overriding
objective in the
law?
Yes, in
The
Act
on
Narodowy
Bank Polski of 29
August
1997
(Journal of Laws of
2013, item 908, as
amended)

No

Headline CPI

Yes, in
Article 2 of Law
No. 312 in 2004 on
the Statute of the
National Bank of
Romania

Legal Framework Governing the
Institutional
Relationship
between CB and Government

The NBP may provide credit to the
Central Government by issuing
securities in accordance with
Article 49 of the National Bank of
Poland Act.

Article 7 of Law 312 of 2004
prohibits the National Bank of
Romania from purchasing debt
securities
issued
by
the
government in the primary market.
The use of overdraft facilities or
any other type of credit facility for
the benefit of the Government is
prohibited.

Although the MPC constitutes one of the directing bodies of Narodowy Bank Polski as per Article 6 of the Act on NBP, the government is heavily representative in its composition. The MPC
is comprised of the President of the Narodowy Bank Polski in addition to nine members selected by the President of the Republic of Poland, the Sejm and the Senate.
10 As stated on the National Bank of Romania’s website.
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Country

22.Serbia

23.South
Africa

Year of Current
IT
Target
Adoption

2008

2000

3% ± 1.5%

3%-6%

Institutional
Responsibility
for Setting the
Target

Accountability Measures

Jointly
in
cooperation
between
the
National Bank
of Serbia, and
the Government
in accordance
with
the
“Agreement on
Inflation
Targeting” and
“Memorandum
on
Inflation
Targeting
as
Monetary
Strategy”.

The National Bank of Serbia publishes press
releases from the meetings of the Executive
Board on the same day when the meeting was
held. Occasionally, the Governor appears in
press conferences to elaborate on the rationale
behind Executive Board’s decisions and
answer any questions the public may have. A
quarterly Inflation Report is published, and if
inflation deviates from the set target for more
than six consecutive months, the National
Bank of Serbia is obliged to notify the
Government about the reasons for the
deviation, measures to be taken and the time
needed for inflation to return to target level.

Government as
per
the
Minister
of
Finance’s
Medium Term
Budget Policy
Statement

At the conclusion of every MPC meeting, an
MPC statement is issued through a press
conference by the Governor of the Reserve
Bank of South Africa explaining the reasons for
the MPC’s policy stance.
The Bank also publishes its Monetary Policy
Review (MPR) twice a year, which includes
analysis of the domestic and international
developments that have impacted on inflation,
an assessment of the future outlook for the
factors determining inflation as well as the
Bank’s forecast of the future path of inflation.
The Governor of the Bank is required to submit
an annual report on the implementation of
monetary policy to the Minister of Finance. The
Governor also appears regularly in Parliament
to explain the monetary policy stance adopted
by the MPC.
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Formal
Requirement
for
Explanation
of
Deviations?
Yes

Measure
Inflation
Used

of

Headline CPI

Is price stability
outlined as the
sole/overriding
objective in the
law?
Yes, in
Article 3 of the
Law
of
the
National Bank of
Serbia

No

CPI
excluding
cost
of
mortgages
(CPIX)

Yes, in
Article 3 of South
African
Reserve
Bank Act 1989 as
amended)

Legal Framework Governing the
Institutional
Relationship
between CB and Government

In accordance with the Law of the
National Bank of Serbia, “the
National Bank of Serbia may not
approve credit, loans, overdraft
facilities or any other form of
credit facility to the Government
of the Republic of Serbia, nor may
it issue guarantees to settle the
obligations of the Government or
ensure the settlement of its
obligations
otherwise”.
The
National Bank of Serbia may not
purchase securities issued directly
by the Government

According to the South African
Reserve Bank Act No. 90 of 1989,
the Bank may grant loans and
advances to the Government of the
Republic.

Country

24.South
Korea

25. Sweden

Year of Current
IT
Target
Adoption

2001

1993

2%

2%

Institutional
Responsibility
for Setting the
Target

Accountability Measures

Bank of Korea
in consultation
with
the
Ministry
of
Strategy
and
Finance - based
on Article 6,
item 1 of the
Bank of Korea
Act

The Bank of Korea publishes the Monetary
Policy Report to the National Assembly four
times a year to explain how to monetary policy
was implemented towards achievement of the
inflation target. If inflation deviates from the
target by more than 0.5% in either direction for
six consecutive months, the Bank of Korea will
explain the reasons for the deviations, the
projected amount of time, and the monetary
policy strategy towards the return of inflation to
the target, through the Governor's press
conference. If adjustment of the inflation target
becomes necessary, for example, in the case of
unexpected local or international economic
shocks, the Council will adjust the target in
consultation with the Ministry of Strategy and
Finance.
Minutes of the Executive Board meetings on
monetary policy are published including
individual votes of members. Pursuant to
Article 4 of Chapter 6 of the Riksbank Act, the
bank compiles the report “Account of
Monetary Policy”, in conjunction with the
evaluation of monetary policy, which is
conducted by the Riksdag Committee on
Finance on a biannual basis. . This describes
how inflation and the real economy have
developed over the past year.
The Riksbank publishes its Monetary Policy
Report six times a year. Within the report lie
the executive board’s inflation expectations,
monetary policy deliberations, and future
inflation projections. Each report also contains
a description of the new information received
since the previous report and an assessment of
how the Riksbank views the current economic
situation.

Sveriges
Riksbank – in
accordance with
The Riksbank's
Memorandum
on the inflation
target:
clarification and
appraisal
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Formal
Requirement
for
Explanation
of
Deviations?
Yes

Measure
Inflation
Used

of

Headline CPI

Is price stability
outlined as the
sole/overriding
objective in the
law?
Yes, in

The Bank of Korea
Act of 1998

No

CPIF
(the
CPI with a
fixed interest
rate)

Yes, in
Article
2
of
Chapter 1 of the
Sveriges Riksbank
Act of 2007 (The
Sveriges Riksbank
Act, 2016)

Legal Framework Governing the
Institutional
Relationship
between CB and Government

In accordance with Article 75, the
Bank of Korea “may extend
overdrafts or another form of
credits to the Government and
accept government bonds directly
from the Government.” provided
that “the total amount of credits
and directly accepted government
bonds shall not exceed the debt
limit decided by the National
Assembly putting all debts
together borne by the Government
to financial institutions and the
general public”.

According to Chapter 8 of the
Riksbank Act of 2007, “the
Riksbank shall not extend credit to
or purchase debt instruments
directly from the state, another
public body or an institution of the
European
Union”.
The Riksbank may, however,
pursuant to Chapter 6, Article 7
paragraph 2, “grant intraday credit
to the state” and “may also grant
credit to and purchase debt
instruments
from
financial
institutions owned by the state or
another public body.”

Country

26.Thailand

Year of Current
IT
Target
Adoption

2000

2.5%±
1.5%

Institutional
Responsibility
for Setting the
Target

Accountability Measures

Jointly between
the Government
and with the
Bank
of
Thailand - in
accordance with
the Law of the
Bank
of
11
Thailand.

The Bank of Thailand publishes quarterly
Monetary Policy Reports to present the latest
economic forecasts and developments on
inflation, and to inform the public about the
views of the MPC in reaching its monetary
policy decisions.
As stated in a mutual agreement between the
MPC and the Minister of Finance: “If the
inflation target is not met, the MPC should
submit an open letter on why inflation deviated
from the target, the policy measures it is taking
to deal with it, as well as the period that the
MPC expects to return Inflation to the target.
The MPC should also report progress in policy
actions to the Minister of Finance in due
course”.

11 The Minister presents the agreed upon to the Council of Ministers for approval.
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Formal
Requirement
for
Explanation
of
Deviations?
Yes

Measure
Inflation
Used

of

Headline CPI

Is price stability
outlined as the
sole/overriding
objective in the
law?
Yes, in
New
Bank
of
Thailand
Law,
2551 (2008)

Legal Framework Governing the
Institutional
Relationship
between CB and Government

There is no legislation on
restrictions on the provision of
credit from the central bank to the
government

Country

27.Turkey

28.United
Kingdom

Year of Current
IT
Target
Adoption

2006

1992

5% ± 2%

2%
over
the medium
term

Institutional
Responsibility
for Setting the
Target

Accountability Measures

Jointly between
the Government
and the Central
Bank of Turkey
– in accordance
with Article 4
of the Law on
the
Central
Bank of Turkey

Minutes of meetings of the MPC are issued
within five working days following the
meeting. The Inflation Outlook Report is
published on a quarterly basis. If the inflation
rate at the end of the year falls outside the range
of 3% - 7%, the bank writes an open letter to
the government as part of the accountability
procedures as stipulated in Article 42 of the
Central Bank Act. Furthermore, if quarterly
inflation rates exceed the uncertainty level
around the end-of-year target, the central bank
will explain in the inflation reports the causes
of the deviation and measures already taken, as
well as those that will be taken in the future to
achieve the target.
In addition, the Governor appears semiannually in before the Council of Ministers and
the Planning and Budget Committee of the
Grand National Assembly of Turkey to report
on the activities of the Central Bank and the
implementation of monetary policy.
Minutes of the MPC meetings are published
monthly with a two-week delay; the Bank's
inflation report is prepared on a quarterly basis.
These publications give insights into the
analysis of the Bank's inflation expectations
and the way this analysis affects the decisionmaking process of the MPC. If the inflation
target is breached by more than 1%, the
Governor of the Bank of England should write
an open letter to the Treasury Secretary
explaining why the breach occurred and what
the central bank intends to do to bring inflation
back to the target.

The
Government –
as mandated by
Article 12 of
the Act on the
Bank
of
England,
announced
through
an
annual
letter
from
the
Chancellor to
the Bank of
England
(known as the
“Remit for the
MPC”)
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Formal
Requirement
for
Explanation
of
Deviations?
Yes

Measure
Inflation
Used

of

Headline CPI

Is price stability
outlined as the
sole/overriding
objective in the
law?
Yes, in
Article 4 of the
Law on the Central
Bank
of
the
Republic of Turkey
(As amended by
Law No. 4651 of
April 25, 2001)

Yes

CPI including
housing costs
(CPIH)

Yes, in
Article 11 of the
Bank of England
Act of 1998

Legal Framework Governing the
Institutional
Relationship
between CB and Government

In accordance with the Central
Bank of Turkey Law of 2008, the
Bank may not grant advances and
provide credit to the Treasury and
public
institutions.
Debt
instruments issued by the Treasury
and public institutions may not be
purchased in the primary market.

There is no legislation on
restrictions on the provision of
credit from the central bank to the
government

Table 3: Main Findings of the Survey of Country Practices
Institutional Responsibility for Setting the Inflation Target
Number of Countries Percentage of Countries
(out of 28)
Government
5
17.86%
Central Bank
7
25%
Jointly
16
57.14%
Official Document Defining Institutional Responsibility for Setting the Inflation Target

Central Bank Law
Presidential/Congressional Decree
Other

Number of Countries
(out of 28)
17
4
7

Percentage of Countries
60.71%
14.29%
25%

The Institutional Relationship Between the Central Bank and the Government
Number of Countries
(out of 28)
16

Percentage of Countries

Number of Countries
(out of 28)
12

Percentage of Countries

16

57.14%

The law prohibits the direct
57.14%
provision of credit or financing of
the government by the Central
Bank.
The law places quantitative
5
17.86%
restrictions on the direct provision
of credit or financing of the
government by the Central Bank.
There are no restrictions on the
7
25%
direct provision of credit or
financing of the government by the
Central Bank.
Obligation of the Central Bank to Explain Deviations of Inflation from its Target

The central bank is legally obliged
to address any deviations in
inflation from the target
The central bank is NOT legally
obliged to address any deviations in
inflation from the target

42.85%
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Definition of the Inflation Target
Number of Countries Percentage of Countries
(out of 28)
Point target
5
17.86%
Range
6
21.43%
Point target with a tolerance band
17
60.71%
Bandwidth of the Target Range for Countries that Use a Range or Point Target with a
Tolerance Interval (out of 23)

2 Percent
3 Percent
4 Percent

Number of Countries Percentage of Countries
(out of 23)
15
65.22%
5
21.74%
2
8.70%
Measure of Inflation Used for Expression of the Inflation Target

Headline CPI
Core CPI

Number of Countries
(out of 28)
24
4

Percentage of Countries
85.71%
14.29%

Analysis of Country Practices
It was found that in approximately 57% of IT countries (16 out of 28 countries), the
inflation target is set in a collaborative manner between the Central Bank and the
Government. In these countries, the Central Bank has some degree of goal independence,
and the degree to which the Central Bank can influence the inflation target varies from
one country to another. This figure is reflective of the actual experiential practices that
are observed in the country, regardless of whether or not they are backed by legislation.
For instance, in Hungary the inflation target is set by the Central Bank only after a
consensus is reached with the Government of Hungary, although the Hungarian law does
not mandate this. In another 18% of countries (5 out of 28 countries), the government
alone sets the inflation target without consulting the Central Bank. For these countries,
the Central Bank has a minimal degree of goal independence. In total, 75% of IT
countries’ governments are involved in the setting of the inflation target (either
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independently or by coordination with the Central Bank). The common view shared
among these countries is that the practice of involving the government in the process of
setting the inflation targets delivers a high degree of accountability of the Central Bank to
the government and to the public for achieving them. In Indonesia for example,
legislation was passed to transfer the authority to set the inflation target from the Central
Bank to the government in a move to “strengthen the credibility” of the Central Bank
according to Bank Indonesia’s website. In the remaining 25% of countries (7 out of 28
countries), the Central Bank has institutional responsibility for setting its own inflation
targets. Central Banks in these countries possess a high degree of goal independence.
In all countries, some form of official documentation is used to define institutional
responsibility for setting the target. Around 61% of countries (17 out of 28 countries)
have a clause or provision within the chief Law or Act governing the Central Bank that
outlines the procedure by which the target is set and the institutional responsibility for
setting it. A Presidential, or Congressional (or Royal, in the case of Norway) Decree is
the official document in which institutional responsibility for setting the target is
expressed for approximately 14% of countries. In the remaining 25% of countries,
another form of official documentation is used. In Sweden, for example, there are two
documents that delegate responsibility of setting the target to the National Bank of
Serbia, namely the “Agreement between the National Bank of Serbia and the Republic of
Serbia on Inflation Targeting” and the “Memorandum of the National Bank of Serbia on
Inflation Targeting as Monetary Strategy”.
Often, central banks with inflation targets are directly accountable to the government
or the parliament. Having the Central Bank Governor appear before Parliament, as well
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as the legal obligation of the Central Bank to submit annual reports to relevant
government officials are the principal means of accountability. For example, since the
introduction of IT in New Zealand in 1990, the Governor of the Reserve Bank of New
Zealand is required to submit a biannual Monetary Policy Statement discussing the extent
to which the central bank has achieved inflation targets announced over the past six
months and the proposed monetary strategy for the next six months. This document and
the procedure by which it is presented served as a platform for holding the central bank
accountable, prompting other countries to follow a similar model. The publication of
minutes of MPC meetings is another widely established means of guaranteeing increased
transparency of Central Bank decision-making. In most countries (around 78%, or 22 out
of 28 countries), the Central Bank is legally required to prepare and submit some form of
documentation or report directly to the Government or Parliament on a regular basis
explaining the developments in monetary policy and the strategy for the forthcoming
period. In 11% of countries, the Central Bank is not bound by law to submit said
documentation to the Government or to Parliament, but it is legally compelled to publish
the decisions and results of monetary policy to the general public. Although, in practice,
all 28 countries surveyed do produce a regular report dedicated to assessing inflation
outcomes, prospects and projections for the reporting period, the remaining 11% of
countries, are not formally required to do so by law.
In 43% of the countries, there is a formal legal obligation (either a provision or article
in the law governing the Central Bank itself, or in another law or decree), that states that
the Central Bank is responsible for addressing any deviations away from the inflation
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target to the Government and the general public, either in an open letter or in the periodic
Inflation Report.
Since IT necessitates that the Central Bank operate in the absence of fiscal
dominance, my analysis on country practices includes a look into the legal framework
governing the restrictions (or lack thereof) on political pressure on Central Bank to
finance government deficits. As such, it was found that 57% of countries that have an IT
framework in place have legal provisions that prohibit or interdict the direct provision of
credit or financing of the Government by the Central Bank. In some cases, such as in
Brazil, the emphasis on the prohibition of the Central Bank financing of Government
deficit is so significant that it is spelt out in the Constitution, the highest or most supreme
law of a country. Some countries allow the provision of credit to the government with
certain quantitative restrictions. For example, in Canada, the Bank of Canada may extend
loans or advances for periods not exceeding six months to the Government of Canada or
the government of a province, provided that at any one time the existing loans do not
exceed one third of the Government of Canada's estimated revenue for the fiscal year, or
one quarter of estimated revenue in the case of provincial governments. These countries
represent 18% of the total. On the other side of the spectrum, some countries such as New
Zealand do not mention any restrictions on Government borrowing from the Central
Bank; they represent 25% of the total.
International experiences with IT also shed light on the operational framework of the
IT regimes in different countries in terms of defining the inflation target itself. Some
countries – 5 out of 28 - define the target as a specific level of inflation, or a point target
(for example, 2%), others – 6 out of 28 - define it as a range (for example, between 1%
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and 3%), but most countries -17 out of 28 - use a point target with a tolerance interval
(for example 2% ± 1%). International experience has shown that the design of the target
involves a tradeoff between flexibility and credibility (Dennis, 1997). Using a point target
may provide credibility gains to the Central Bank since it implies more commitment
committing to a specific inflation target but since it is virtually impossible to control
inflation completely, consistent and significant deviation from the target could in fact
undermine credibility. If the Central Bank in question does not use a point target, the
same logic is applied to the bandwidth of the range or the tolerance band of the inflation
target: the narrower the tolerance/range bandwidth, the higher the credibility gains of the
Central Bank if it stays on target, and the more difficult it will be to achieve the target
consistently without persistent deviations. Out of the 23 countries that use a range or a
point target with a tolerance interval, 15 countries have targets with a bandwidth of 2%, 5
countries have targets with a bandwidth of 3%, 2 countries (namely Ghana and Turkey)
have targets with a bandwidth of 4%, while Australia is the only country with a target
bandwidth of 1%.
Almost 86% of countries (24 out of 28 countries) express their inflation target in
terms of the year on year change in headline (total) CPI. Some of these countries, such as
Korea, have only recently switched to using headline CPI. The remaining four countries
use some form of underlying or core CPI as their target. For instance, South Africa
employs the consumer price index excluding mortgage costs (CPIX). It should be noted,
however, that all countries keep a close eye on measures of core or underlying inflation
that exclude the most volatile items.

4.3 Egypt’s De Jure and De Facto Institutional Framework
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Since Egypt initiated a new economic and structural reform program supported by
the Extended Fund Facility from the IMF in November 2016, the search for a new
nominal anchor has been underway. In this regard, the new objective seems to be a
temporary switch to a monetary targeting regime in the short run, while moving towards
the implementation of a full-fledged IT regime in the medium term. In order to achieve
this objective, the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE), released a draft law indicating its desire
to transition towards IT. Towards that end, a new draft law for the CBE amending the
previous Law no. 88 of 2003 of the "Central Bank, Banking Sector and Monetary
System" is currently under review. Although the draft law contains provisions which
strengthen the operational independence of the CBE as the sole entity entitled to the
autonomous conduct of monetary policy, it is lacking in terms of defining the
mechanisms by which the CBE is held accountable for the achievement (or lack thereof)
of its targets; a cornerstone of IT implementation and management. It is also unclear
whether or not the government will have a role in the setting of the inflation target in
coordination with the CBE.
The independence of the CBE should be considered through the lens of both “de
jure” independence, which is the legal independence that the CBE is formally granted in
the Egyptian constitution and relevant laws, and also through the lens of “de facto”
independence, which is what is observed in reality based on past practices. It should be
noted that the two are not always one and the same, especially in developing countries,
where law enforcement and the regulatory framework are not always as strong as they
should be.
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In terms of the legal framework, Article 10 of the “Law of The Central Bank, The
Banking Sector And Money”, states that the governor of the CBE is selected by the
President of Egypt upon nomination from the Prime Minister to serve for a four-year term
subject to renewal. The governor then nominates two deputy governors who are also
appointed by Presidential Decree for a four-year renewable term. The Board of Directors
of the CBE, the responsible entity for the formulation and implementation of monetary
policy decisions in the country, is made up of nine members, including the governor, his
two deputies, the Chairman of the General Authority for Financial Supervision, a
representative from the Ministry of Finance, and four “experienced” members in
monetary and financial affairs, also selected by the President of the Republic and
appointed by Presidential Decree as per the current law. In the proposed draft law, the
composition of the BoD is same, except the number of members is changed from a total
of nine, to a total of “up to eleven” members including “one or more Deputy Governors”
as opposed to the clear specification of two Deputy Governors in the current law. What
this means is that there is a degree of freedom in the new draft law for the Governor of
the CBE to select one, two, three, or four deputies. The draft law does not provide
justification as to why the number of members of the BoD was increased to a total of
eleven, a high number compared to international standards. No clear specification of the
number of Deputy Governors is also unnecessary and only complicates the organizational
structure and clouds it with ambiguity.
Another important pillar of the legal framework relevant to the discussion is the
fact that the President of the Republic ultimately selects (or must approve) all voting
members casts doubt on the legal independence of the CBE. Additionally, the relatively
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short term of the Governor, as well as the fact that there is no clause granting immunity to
the Governor from being fired, indicates that the legal framework puts the Governor of
the central bank at a high risk of succumbing to political pressure. In one instance, Ali
Negm who was appointed as CBE Governor in 1985 served a tenure of only 1 year, and
was replaced by Mahmoud Hamed in 1986 immediately after a new Prime Minister was
appointed (Kamaly & Farrag, 2007).
Article 5 in the Central Bank Law of 2003, which maintained that the goals of
monetary policy would be set in coordination between the CBE and the government
through a “coordinating committee”, is replaced by Article 19 in the new draft law, in
which this provision is deleted completely, thereby removing with it the legal framework
governing the setting of the inflation target. This sparks an important discussion about
whether or not the CBE should have full goal independence in addition to instrument
independence. The notion that the CBE would be entitled to full instrument and goal
independence without any accountability measures set in the context of a legal
framework seems counterproductive and nonconductive to a well-functioning IT
framework. Thus, it is suggested that, at least in the first stages of IT adoption, there
should be cooperation and consensus between the CBE and the government in setting the
inflation target and this cooperation should be formalized and integrated into the legal
framework governing the institutional setup.
The de facto level of independence of the CBE is also questionable. A study was
conducted in 2007 using four indices, including one legal index and three behavioral
indices (based on past practices), in order to measure the degree of independence of the
CBE (Kamaly & Farrag, 2007). The three behavioral indices included in the research are
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the turnover of Central Bank Governor Index, which is hypothesized to be higher when
Central Bank independence is lower, the Political Vulnerability of Central Bank
Governors Index, and finally, a Questionnaire-Based Independence Index that is
computed based on a survey of monetary and financial experts as an indication of their
views on the observed independence of the central bank based on past practices. The
general conclusion of the paper is that the degree of independence of the CBE based on
the indices studied is relatively low, especially when compared to that of Latin American
countries during the 1990’s, the same period during which a number of these Latin
American countries adopted an IT regime.
A low degree of fiscal dominance is crucial to the conduct of independent
monetary policy, and in turn, a successful monetary policy regime. The legislative
framework in Egypt does not have a clause that prevents the CBE from financing
government deficits. In fact, Article 27 of the law on the CBE states that the CBE shall
extend finance to the government, provided that said extension of finance to the
government to cover seasonal deficits “shall not exceed 10% of the average revenues of
the general budget in the three previous years. The term of said finance shall be three
months renewable for other similar periods. It shall be settled in full within twelve
months at most from the date of its extension”.
Although there is no quantitative measure for fiscal dominance that is set-instone, there is a general consensus that consistently high budget deficit to GDP,
government debt to GDP, and net claims on government to GDP ratios are an indication
of a high degree of fiscal dominance (Bank for International Settlements, 2012). When
these ratios are constantly high, the government could resort to pressuring the central
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bank to increase the money supply in order to finance its deficit, which has an
inflationary impact on the economy.
Figure 9: General Government Deficit (% of GDP)
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Egypt has registered unswervingly high rates of general government deficit as a
percentage of GDP, with the ratio declining slowly only in the past three years. In
comparison to the average for emerging market and developing countries and the average
for the Middle East and North Africa, Egypt’s deficit to GDP ratio has been significantly
larger. While progress is being made to slowly bring down the government deficit to
GDP ratio, it is still worryingly high.
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Figure 10: Net Claims on Central Government (% of GDP)
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Comparing Egypt’s net claims on government to GDP ratio with that of lower
middle-income countries, as well as that of Middle East and North Africa countries
(excluding high income countries) shows that Egypt has had a significantly higher ratio
on a consistent basis. This discrepancy between Egypt and the average of comparable
economies has become even more apparent since 2010. The latest figures for 2016 show
Egypt has a staggeringly high ratio of net claims on central government to GDP of
around 70%, which is more than three times that of lower middle income countries’
average, and around two times that of the average of the Middle East and North Africa
excluding high income countries.
Past experiences have displayed the Egyptian government’s tendency to finance
its deficit through financing from the Central Bank (Awad, 2008). Additionally, an
empirical study that aimed at studying the de facto ability of the CBE to resist
government pressure for deficit financing found that in practice, CBE succumbed to
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political pressure and was unable to keep its money growth targets, indicating a high
degree of fiscal dominance (Awad, 2010). It is thus suggested that there should be an
official framework in place to curtail fiscal dominance. As demonstrated by international
practices or experiences, efforts to achieve this can be embodied in legal provisions that
prohibit or place limitations on CBE lending to the government and its entities or the
monetization of government debts and deficits.
Due to the intertwined nature of the effects of fiscal policy and monetary policy,
fiscal consolidation by means of expenditure rationalization and tax system reform will
strengthen the effectiveness of monetary policy by minimizing the degree of fiscal
dominance. The government has already made progress towards execution of an
impressive fiscal consolidation program by undertaking steps such as the gradual phasing
out of inefficient and poorly targeted energy subsidies, streamlining of the public wage
bill, and augmenting tax revenues through the introduction of the value-added tax (VAT)
in place of the general sales tax (GST) as well as tax administration reform. It is
recommended that these efforts be further supported by widening the tax base through
formalizing the informal sector, subjecting exempted items to the VAT, and by curtailing
tax evasion.
Egypt has made progress towards making price stability the primary, overarching
objective of monetary policy. Al-Mashat (2011) previously employed a small open
economy structural gap model to test the effect of varying degrees of exchange rate
flexibility on inflation and output volatility under an IT regime in Egypt. In doing so, she
found that higher exchange rate flexibility is associated with lower inflation and output
volatility, and a smaller inflation/output sacrifice ratio. In coherence with Al-Mashat’s
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findings, and as evidenced by the CBE’s recent decision to liberalize the Egyptian pound
in November 2016, it is clear that the CBE is taking serious steps towards making price
stability its sole target. This commitment to the superiority of the price stability objective
is further evidenced by the CBE’s amendment of its objective from “overall financial
stability in the context of the political and economic goals of the government” to “price
stability” in the new draft law.
In terms of technical capabilities, the CBE faces a dilemma in the selection of an
appropriate index for inflation that is not uncommon amongst developing countries
(Silver, 2006). In Egypt, the problem with headline CPI as an index for inflation is that it
comprises all consumer goods and services, including subsidized goods and foodstuffs.
Incorporating these two categories is problematic due to the highly volatile nature of their
prices. Thus, the use of headline CPI as the measure of inflation will make it substantially
more difficult to reliably forecast inflation and set realistic inflation targets, which could
severely damage the credibility of the central bank (Youssef, 2007). The use of a core
CPI measure that excludes these items, on the other hand, is also inapt because it does not
depict a realistic picture of the level of prices due to the significant weight that the two
aforementioned categories of goods have in the Egyptian consumer basket. Therefore, the
CBE must work towards an appropriate measure of inflation if it is to adopt IT in the near
future. In accordance with international practices, it is recommended that headline
inflation be used for the inflation target itself, but that core inflation is closely and
attentively monitored to enhance understanding of developments in the price level and
guide policy making accordingly. Moreover, accurate inflation forecasting will command
the timely availability of high-quality data and sophisticated forecasting models. Previous
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work was done to assess the quality of data available in Egypt using the Data Quality
Assessment Framework (Ghalwash, 2011). It was found that the quality of data in Egypt
was subpar and insufficient to produce precise inflation forecasts, and that the areas in
which the data was lacking the most were accuracy and reliability.
Another important component towards assessing the ability of the CBE to forecast
inflation to a suitable degree of accuracy will be to determine whether a strong and stable
relationship can be established between monetary policy tools and inflation. This requires
proper econometric analysis, and so a separate section in the paper is designated for the
purpose of explaining in detail the sources of data used, the procedure undertaken, and
the results obtained.

4.4 Determining the Strength of the Relationship Between Monetary
Policy Tools and Inflation in Egypt: A VAR Analysis
The empirical analysis to come dissects one of the preconditions of a wellfunctioning IT regime: the proper and accurate understanding of the relationship between
monetary policy tools and the ultimate monetary policy goal of inflation. Inflation is
measured as the consumer price index (CPI). The vector autoregressive model and
Granger causality tests in the bivariate and multivariate forms have been used extensively
in the literature to test the aforementioned relationship. In line with the methods
undertaken by Gottschalk and Moore (2001), Tutar (2002) and, more recently, by
Bakradze and Billmeier (2007), and more recently Mishra and Mishra (2010) and Odior
(2012), this paper intends to use the VAR methodology and subsequent bivariate and
multivariate Granger-causality tests to determine the strength of the relationship between
monetary policy tools and inflation, taking into account the effects of other interrelated
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macroeconomic variables. In general, VAR systems are often employed to forecast
systems of interrelated time series, and to investigate the impact of random shocks on the
system of variables.
Table 4: Summary of Studies Testing the Feasibility of IT using VAR Models
Author(s)
Country Methodology
Aliyu
and Nigeria
The authors employ
Englam (2009)
the
VAR
methodology and then
perform
Granger
causality tests to build
a case for the
adoption of IT in
Nigeria.

Variables Used
GDP,
CPI,
money supply,
interest
rates,
fiscal spending
and
the
exchange rate

Bakradze and Georgia
Billmeier
(2007)

Output
(real
GDP), the price
level (CPI), a
measure
of
liquidity
(currency
in
circulation), the
level
of
international
reserves, and the
nominal
effective
exchange rate.

Chinaemerem Nigeria
&
Akujuobi and
(2012)
Ghana

The authors conduct
an
empirical
exploration into the
stability
of
the
monetary
transmission
mechanism
in
Georgia
using
extensions
to
a
baseline VAR model,
Granger
causality
tests and variance
decomposition
analysis.
The authors start with
a two-variable VAR
model incorporating
money supply and
price level, and work
their way up to a fivevariable VAR system
to study the effect of
innovations in money
supply on inflation in
Ghana and Nigeria.

Narrow money
supply
(M1),
consumer price
index
(CPI),
nominal
exchange
rate
and the interest
rates
on
3
months
time
deposit.

Results
Results show that the link between
prices and credit and interest rate
channels were is weak and unstable.
Additionally, evidence of strong
inverse link between exchange rate
and prices was found. This suggests
exchange rate pass-through on the
level of prices in the economy. The
paper, therefore, recommends the
pursuance of initial steps towards IT
in Nigeria, rather than a fully-fledged
IT regime.
They find that IT would be a feasible
option for Georgia in the medium
term, pending the completion of
institutional and operational reform of
the Central Bank.

They find that, even after including
financial variables such as the
exchange rate and interest rates, the
model is not a statistically significant
predictor of inflation outcomes in
either country
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Christoffersen, Poland
Slok
and
Wescott (1999)

Gottschalk
Poland
and
Moore
(2001)

Hoffimaister
(1999)

Korea

The authors use a
VAR
methodology
and
subsequent
Granger
causality
tests to analyze the
statistical
relationships between
monetary
policy
instruments
and
numerous variants of
inflation, such as
headline inflation and
underlying inflation.
Gottschalk and Moore
utilize
a
VAR
framework to analyze
the effectiveness of
an IT framework in
Poland.

Monetary
aggregates,
interest
rates,
exchange rates,
real
activity
variables, labor
market
variables,
foreign
price
indices, and CPI.

They find that the relationship
between short-term interest rates and
headline inflation is weak, and that it
is slightly stronger for underlying
inflation. They concur that in spite of
the seemingly flaky linkage between
policy rates and inflation, the linkage
would become stronger and more
predictable when the Polish economy
completed its stabilization period.

The nominal
effective
exchange rate,
and the threemonth treasury
bill rate as
policy variables,
plus industrial
production,
nominal wages,
and the CPI.

Hoffimaister uses the
VAR
model
in
conjunction
with
impulse
response
analysis to determine
the
degree
of
predictability
of
inflation in Korea.

Import
prices,
nominal
exchange rate,
broad
money,
corporate bond
rate, CPI, output

They find that although the exchange
rate served as the prevailing monetary
policy instrument throughout the
1990’s, the relationship between
short-term interest rates and inflation
was feeble in Poland. Rather than
discarding IT on this premise
altogether, the authors suggest
modifying some elements in the IT
strategy, such as widening the target
range, to make it more applicable for
Poland.
The author asserts that his empirical
analysis supports the implementation
of IT in Korea, building on the fact
that the strength of the relationship
between policy variables and inflation
in Korea is similar to that of other
advanced IT economies prior to the
introduction of IT.
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Mishra
& India
Mishra (2010)

The paper analyzed
the preconditions for
inflation targeting in
India and built sector
specific
Vector
Autoregression
(VAR)
models to assess its
suitability
as
a
monetary
policy
framework for India.
They

Inflation
(measured by a
rate of change in
wholesale price
index),
output
gap,
nominal
effective
exchange rate,
monetary policy
instrument,
gross bank credit
and
broad
monetary
aggregate (M3).

They find that external supply shocks
and shocks in the exchange rate cause
significant variation in inflation, and
that they should be incorporated in the
model for evaluation of monetary
policy.

Tutar (2002)

Turkey

The authors utilize a
VAR framework to
analyze the feasibility
of an IT framework in
Poland.

Money supply
(M1),
CPI,
nominal
exchange rate,
real
gross
domestic
product (GDP),
and the interest
rates
on
3
months
time
deposits.

The author’s results indicate that the
statistical
relationship
between
monetary policy instruments and
inflation do not seem to be strong and
predictable in the Turkish framework
under the VAR methodology, and that
inflation seems to be an inertial
phenomenon

Woglom
(2000)

South
Africa

To empirically assess
the feasibility of IT in
South
Africa,
Woglom employs a
VAR methodology to
study the dynamic
relationship between
monetary policy tools
and the price level in
South Africa.

A
monetary
instrument, the
price level as
measured by the
CPI, the level of
real GDP, and
the
nominal
exchange rate

The study finds that an IT regime
would not be effective for the South
African economy, largely due to the
fact that the relationship between
monetary policy and inflation is not
strong enough.

Tarek Ghalwash (2011) adopts a methodology akin to the aforementioned
literature to measure the strength of monetary policy tools on steering inflation outcomes
in Egypt. He concludes that the baseline VAR and Granger-causality test results point to
the fact that the relationship between policy variables and inflation in Egypt is neither
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reliable nor predictable, leading him to advise against the implementation of IT in Egypt.
This analysis builds on his findings, but nonetheless differs from his study in several
ways. While Ghalwash employed annual data over a 12-year period, this analysis will
include quarterly data from Q1 2005 till Q3 2017. This implies the data in this study
includes the effects of the January 2011 revolution as well as the effects of the recent
IMF-driven structural reform program, of which the November 2016 float of the
exchange rate is a critical part. Additionally, this analysis will commence with a twovariable model of M2 and CPI and develop gradually into a six-variable model in order to
isolate the marginal effects of including other financial variables such as the exchange
rate and government expenditure in the model.
4.4.1 Model and Data Specification
The analysis utilizes the VAR methodology and augments it with bivariate and
multivariate Granger causality tests on the baseline VAR model. The baseline VAR
model can be represented as follows:

𝑋𝑡 = 𝐴(𝐿)𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝐵(𝐿)𝑍𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
In the above reduced-form representation, 𝑋𝑡 is a vector of endogenous variables,
and 𝑍𝑡 is a vector of exogenous variables. The endogenous variables included in the
vector 𝑋𝑡 are consumer price index (CPI), broad money (M2), the average overnight
interbank rate (R), the nominal exchange rate (FX), government expenditure (Gvt) and
the real GDP (GDP). The CBE’s operational target is set within the boundaries of the
overnight lending and deposit rates corridor, and the exact rate determined by market
forces within the corridor is the overnight interbank rate. Thus, the average overnight
interbank rate was used as a proxy for interest rates since it best represents the monetary
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policy stance of the CBE at a given point in time. All variables are included in their
logarithmic form, except for the average overnight interbank rate, which is included as a
level.
𝑍𝑡 = 𝐶𝑃𝐼, 𝐺𝐷𝑃, 𝑀2, 𝐹𝑋, 𝑅, 𝐺𝑣𝑡
The data utilized for the conduction of this analysis is quarterly data from Q1
2005 till Q3 2017 from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS), the CBE, the
Ministry of Finance, and the World Bank. The statistical program being used is Stata
13.0.
4.4.2 Testing for Stationarity using Unit Root Test
As per the literature, the unit root test is employed to first determine whether or
not the variables are stationary. To be stationary, a time series needs to have a constant
mean, variance, and autocovariance for each given lag. If the time series does not satisfy
these conditions, it is categorized as non-stationary. For the purposes of my analysis, the
variables must exhibit stationarity to ensure that the effect of shocks is gradually
eliminated (shocks remain persistent in non-stationary series) (Brooks, 2008).
Additionally, the results obtained by regressing non-stationary data can be misleading
and ultimately valueless due to the phenomenon known as “spurious regression”,
whereby the results of the regression suggest that two independent non-stationary
variables exhibit a causality relationship when in fact, they do not. Thus, the DickeyFuller test, the most prominent test for stationarity in the literature, is employed (A.
Dickey & A. Fuller, 1979). One specific variation of the Dickey-Fuller test, namely, the
augmented Dickey-Fuller test includes a constant and a trend. The null hypothesis for
each variable in the series is that it has a unit root, or alternatively if the null hypothesis is
rejected, the series is stationary at the selected level of significance.
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Below is a summary table of the results of the augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test on
all variables:
Table 5: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Results
Level

First Difference

CPI

0.9990

0.0015**

Interest

0.9991

0.0004**

M2

0.9990

0.0000**

Government Expenditure

0.5118

0.0000**

GDP

0.8476

0.0000**

Exchange rate

0.9986

0.0000**

** denotes rejection at the 5% level
The results show that we fail to reject the null unit-root hypothesis at the 5%
significance level for all variables. To proceed with the analysis, the first difference of the
variables is taken to conduct a second unit root. Taking the first difference and testing
again for a second unit root results in the rejection of the null hypothesis for all variables.
Now that all variables have been made stationary, the analysis may proceed. The graphs
of the variables in their logarithmic forms (except for interest) and their first differences
are presented below:
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Figure 11: The Logarithm of the Broad Money
Supply (M2)

Figure 12: The First Difference of the Logarithm
of Broad Money Supply (M2)

Figure 13: The Logarithm of the CPI

Figure 14: The First Difference of the Logarithm
of CPI
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Figure 15: The Logarithm of the Government
Expenditure

Figure 16: The First Difference of the Logarithm
of the Government Expenditure

Figure 17: The Interest Rate

Figure 18: The First Difference of the
Interest Rate
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Figure 19: The Logarithm of the GDP

Figure 20: The First Difference of the Logarithm
of the GDP

Figure 21: The Logarithm of the FX
Rate

Figure 22: The First Difference of the
Logarithm of the FX Rate
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4.4.3 Determining the Optimal Number of Lags
The ADF test assumes that the time series follow an AR(p) process, where “p”
lagged difference terms of the dependent variable y are included in the equation.
Determining the optimal number of lags (p) is thus needed to run the VAR model.
This can be done by employing a number of tests. The three most popular tests are
Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion
(SBIC), and the Hannan-Quinn criterion.
Running lag order selection diagnostics was used to determine the optimal
number of lags. The SBIC, HQIC and the Akaike’s information criterion all
recommend four lags, which means we use this number of lags through the rest of the
VAR analysis. As per the literature and given the relatively short time span covered
by the data (eleven and a half years), a more thorough analysis involving long-run
cointegrating relationships is not included in this paper.12
Table 6: Selection-order Criteria
Number of obs = 39
lag

df

p

FPE

AIC

HQIC

SBIC

0

36

0.000

2.0e+23

70.6592

70.7511

70.9152

1

36

0.000

2.3e+18

59.2614

59.9041

61.0529

2

36

0.000

8.3e+17

58.1251

59.3189

61.4523

3

36

0.000

2.7e+17

56.637

58.3817

61.4997

4

36

0.000

2.2e+16

53.2377*

55.5334*

59.636*

Source: Author’s Calculations

12

Although a VEC model, which is more equipped to deal with cointegrating time
series, was also run and is also included in the Appendix of this paper to check the
robustness of the VAR results.
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4.4.4 Results13
A dependent variable is said to “Granger-cause” another independent variable
if, given a specified set of past values of the second variable, the past values of the
first variable assist in predicting values of the second. The null hypothesis for the
Granger-causality test postulates that the time series of the variable X does not
provide statistically significant information to predict the time series Y (in other
words, X does not Granger-cause Y). The rejection of the null hypothesis at a certain
significance level would imply the alternative that past values of X are indeed useful
in the prediction of values of Y (in other words, X Granger-causes Y).
The following analysis makes use of running the VAR methodology and
running subsequent Granger-causality tests to determine whether or not the variables
in question have a significant impact on CPI (and on GDP for the six-variable model).
Making use of Tutar’s (2002) methodology, I start with two simple two variable
model’s – CPI and M2, and CPI and interest rates- and gradually augment the model
with one additional variable until I reach the final model, which includes all six
variables. This methodology is especially useful in identifying the effect of
complicating the model with one additional variable at each stage of analysis. The
results are presented below:
Two Variables: The Effect of M2 on CPI
Effect on CPI
M2

Chi 2
32.132

P-value
0.000**

Remarks
Conclusion
P-value is significant at all M2 Grangersignificance levels, we causes CPI
reject the null

Table 7: Two Variable VAR Results: The Effect of M2 on CPI

*, ** denote rejection at the 10% and 5% level, respectively

13

The VAR model results are presented in the appendix of this paper.
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Two Variables: The Effect of R on CPI
Effect on CPI
R

Chi 2
16.792

P-value
0.000**

Remarks
Conclusion
P-value is significant at all Interest
rate
significance levels, we Granger-causes
reject the null
CPI

Table 8: Two Variable VAR Results: The Effect of R on CPI

*, ** denote rejection at the 10% and 5% level, respectively
Three Variables: The Effect of M2 and R on CPI
Effect on CPI
M2

Chi 2
19.238

P-value
0.000**

Interest

6.366

0.041**

Jointly

44.936

0.000**

Remarks
P-value is significant at all
significance levels, we
reject the null
P-value is significant at
0.05 significance level, we
reject the null
P-value is significant at all
significance levels, we
reject the null

Conclusion
M2 Grangercauses CPI
Interest
Granger-causes
CPI
All variables
jointly
Granger-cause
CPI

Table 9: Three Variable VAR Results: The Effect of M2 and R on CPI

*, ** denote rejection at the 10% and 5% level, respectively
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Four Variables: The Effect of M2, R and FX on CPI
Effect on CPI
M2

Chi 2
5.0054

P-value
0.082*

R

5.6466

0.059*

FX

1.1513

0.562

Jointly

44.936

0.000**

Remarks
P-value is significant at 0.1
significance level, we
reject the null
P-value is significant at
0.05 significance level, we
reject the null
P-value is insignificant at
all significance levels, we
fail to reject the null
P-value is significant at all
significance levels, we
reject the null

Conclusion
M2 Grangercauses CPI
Interest
Granger-causes
CPI
FX does not
Granger-cause
CPI
All variables
jointly
Granger-cause
CPI

Table 10: Four Variable VAR Results: The Effect of M2, R and FX on CPI

*, ** denote rejection at the 10% and 5% level, respectively
Five Variables: The Effect of M2, R, FX and Gvt Expenditure on CPI
Effect on CPI
M2

Chi 2
2.7011

P-value
0.259

R

2.8664

0.239

FX

1.8396

0.399

Gvt
Expenditure

0.50075

0.779

Jointly

10.026

0.263

Remarks
P-value is insignificant at
all significance levels, we
fail to reject the null
P-value is insignificant at
all significance levels, we
fail to reject the null
P-value is insignificant at
all significance levels, we
fail to reject the null
P-value is insignificant at
all significance levels, we
fail to reject the null

Conclusion
M2 does not
Granger-cause
CPI
Interest does
not Grangercause CPI
FX does not
Granger-cause
CPI
Gvt
Expenditure
does
not
Granger-cause
CPI
P-value is insignificant at All variables
all significance levels, we do not jointly
fail to reject the null
Granger-cause
CPI

Table 11: Five Variable VAR Results: The Effect of M2, R, FX and Gvt Expenditure on CPI

*, ** denote rejection at the 10% and 5% level, respectively
Six Variables: The Effect of M2, R, FX, Gvt Expenditure, and GDP on CPI
Effect on CPI

Chi 2

P-value

Remarks

Conclusion
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M2

6.3453

0.042**

R

0.58833

0.745

FX

4.1727

0.063*

Gvt
Expenditure

5.3137

0.070*

GDP

8.8678

0.012**

Jointly

21.116

0.02**

P-value is significant at
0.05 significance level, we
reject the null
P-value is insignificant at
all significance levels, we
fail to reject the null
P-value is significant at
0.1 significance level, we
reject the null
P-value is significant at
0.1 significance level, we
reject the null

M2 Grangercauses CPI
Interest does
not Grangercause CPI
FX Grangercauses CPI

Gvt
Expenditure
Granger-causes
CPI
P-value is significant at GDP Granger0.05 significance level, we causes CPI
reject the null
P-value is significant at All variables
0.05 significance level, we jointly
reject the null
Granger-cause
CPI

Table 12: Six Variable VAR Results: The Effect of M2, R, FX, Gvt Expenditure, and GDP on CPI

*,

**

denote

rejection

at

the

10%

and

5%

level,

respectively
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Impulse Response Graphs of Monetary Policy Tools14
Figure 23: Impulse Response of CPI to CPI

Figure 24: Impulse Response of CPI to Interest Rates

14

The IRF graphs for remaining variables are presented in the appendix.
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Figure 25: Impulse Response of CPI to M2
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Variance Decomposition of CPI
Table 13: Variance Decomposition of CPI

Step

dcpi

dm2

dinterest

dfx

dgvt

dgdp

1

0.875962

0.018323

0.003374

0.041781

0.01366

0.0469

2

0.730328

0.014022

0.036693

0.131836

0.033971

0.053149

3

0.690343

0.041802

0.041121

0.114711

0.06625

0.045399

4

0.626243

0.058081

0.039367

0.114755

0.078433

0.083121

5

0.595803

0.04676

0.032262

0.099093

0.071958

0.154124

6

0.543138

0.041092

0.029866

0.159708

0.078759

0.147437

7

0.538591

0.041125

0.030083

0.159058

0.084897

0.146245

Source: Author’s Calculations
4.4.5 Discussion of the Results
Starting with the two-variable model, both the average overnight interbank
rate and M2 each separately have significant effects on CPI. Combining them both in
the same model (the three-variable model) also produces the similar results. Once the
exchange rate is added in the four-variable model, both M2 and the interest rate still
have a significant effect on CPI at the 10% level, although their significance is
weakened since they are no longer significant at the 5% level. The results of the
bivariate tests of the six-variable model on CPI indicate that broad money supply
(M2), government expenditure, exchange rate and GDP cause significant variation in
the CPI at the 10% significance level. The results support the notion that the
government’s financing needs are a significant driver of inflation, which could be an
indication of fiscal dominance (although other factors, such as the sources of
financing of government expenditure need to be taken into account in order to
validate this claim). Similarly, the significance of the effect of the exchange rate on
CPI points to the existence of a significant exchange rate pass through (ERPT) effect
on the price level in the Egyptian economy. This was made clear with the
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skyrocketing of inflation levels in concurrence with the floating of the Egyptian
Pound in November 2016.
One noteworthy observation is that the overnight interbank rate, which forms
the operational target of the CBE, is the only variable that does not have a significant
effect on CPI. This is especially concerning due to the fact that the overnight
interbank rate had a significant Granger-causality effect at all significance levels on
CPI when the two variable (CPI and Interest) and three variable (CPI, Interest and
M2) Granger causality tests were run. This indicates that adding the FX and the
Government Expenditure variables to the model caused the effect of the overnight
interbank rate to weaken from significant to insignificant, further supporting the
aforementioned claim that the presence of a high degree of fiscal dominance and a
high ERPT effect dampen the strength of the relationship between the CBE’s
operational target and its ultimate one. In general, the results point to the conclusion
that although the relationship between the CBE’s intermediate target (M2) and its
ultimate target (CPI) is significantly strong, the relationship between the operational
target (overnight interbank rate) and the ultimate target is neither predictable nor
reliable. This could be a significant impediment to the implementation of an IT
regime since the monetary policy instruments do not have a sufficient impact on
influencing inflation expectations.
The results of the impulse response graphs are in line with those of the
Granger causality tests. A positive shock in the interest rates generates a negative
response in inflation, which mirrors the theoretical relationship between the two.
However, the response generated by the shock in interest rates is not significant. This
further bolsters the results of Granger causality test reported in table 13; that the
relationship between the overnight interbank rate and inflation is neither strong nor
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stable. On the other hand, the impact of a shock in M2 on CPI is initially significant,
and wears off gradually in successive lags. One additional finding relevant to the
analysis is that inflation can be considered an inertial phenomenon in Egypt, that is,
inflation in one period is a significant driver of inflation in the next period. The results
of the variance decomposition indicate that in the first stage, CPI itself accounts for
around 87.5% of the variation in CPI. This effect wears off gradually in successive
stages. The effect of GDP, government spending, and the exchange rate on CPI on the
other hand, intensify in subsequent stages. The shares of M2 and interest rates in the
variance of CPI reach their highest level at the fourth and third stage respectively.
Still, even at its peak, the interest rate accounts for only 4.11% of the variation in CPI,
further corroborating the results of the Granger-causality tests and the IRF analysis.
The deficiency of the statistical link between the interest rate as the CBE’s
operational monetary policy tool and inflation is disconcerting, although unsurprising.
Given the rise of both variables almost monotonically since the beginning of 2016, it
would be natural to anticipate the difficulty for statistical tests to isolate the normal
negative relationship that theory suggests should exist between the two variables. As
economic reforms begin to reap their fruits and the economy begins to stabilize, it is
likely that the statistical relationship between interest rates and inflation will
strengthen over the medium term.

5. Conclusion and Policy Implications
This paper was written with the purpose of answering the question of whether
or not Egypt is ready for the implementation of IT. It employs a twofold methodology
based on an assessment of the institutional and technical framework currently in place
in Egypt, combined with a comprehensive survey of the current international practices
of 28 inflation-targeting countries to determine whether or not the Egyptian
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framework is adequate in meeting the basic preconditions for IT, and to identify the
practical considerations that need to be taken into account if the CBE indeed decides
to adopt an inflation targeting regime in the near future. The assessment of the
institutional framework currently in place in Egypt involved a thorough review of
both the current and proposed legislative framework governing the CBE, and an
appraisal of the de facto observed institutional practices, while the relationship
between monetary policy tools and the ultimate target of low inflation was assessed
by employing a VAR model on data from Q1 2005 till Q3 2017, with subsequent
Granger causality tests.
Through a thorough literature review, the advantages and disadvantages of IT
in relation to its alternatives were analyzed, the basic technical and institutional
prerequisites required for adoption of an IT regime were examined in detail, and the
implications of IT for open, developing economies like Egypt were gauged. Egypt’s
progress towards preparing the economy for IT adoption was evaluated exhaustively,
and a thorough and comprehensive assessment of country experiences with IT to
determine how an IT regime can be tailored to the specific case of Egypt and to
provide policy recommendations regarding steps that can be taken to better prepare
Egypt for IT in the near future.
Given the overall success of the IT framework in the international context, the
fact that that an IT framework has been in the works under the CBE’s agenda since
2005, and the preparatory steps that have already been taken towards a fully fledged
IT regime, the issue for Egypt should no longer be framed in terms of whether or not
Egypt should transition to IT. The deliberations should instead revolve around when
Egypt should move to IT and how the CBE should go about it. Whether countries
wishing to adopt IT need to ensure full attainment of the theoretical prerequisites
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before making the move to IT is debatable, but the fact that an IT regime is a
demanding one in terms of institutional and technical requirements is nearly
universally recognized.
A survey of country practices and international experience with IT set the
stage for benchmarking Egypt’s current position and pinpointing possible
implementation challenges. The major takeaway from comparing the Egyptian
framework with that of established IT countries is that Egypt’s institutional and legal
framework is lacking in terms of defining the institutional responsibility for setting
the inflation target, inclusion of legal provisions that prohibit central bank lending to
the government, and formalizing central bank accountability measures in the
legislation. Some practical issues also arise, such as the inherent tradeoff between
credibility and flexibility in choosing the width of the tolerance band of the inflation
target (or alternatively, selecting a point target). International practices also show that
headline inflation is used as the measure of the inflation target in most countries,
although all countries keep a close eye on measures of core or underlying inflation
that exclude the most volatile items.
Based on the results that emerged from surveying the Egyptian de jure and de
facto institutional framework, it seems the current institutional setup in Egypt is not
currently adequate for a fully-fledged IT regime. As noted, however, the lack of
fulfillment of the aforementioned institutional preconditions undermines the
successful conduct of monetary policy in general under any monetary regime and not
just IT. Nonetheless, it has been argued that the importance of satisfying the
preconditions is more pronounced under IT, as a result of its heavier reliance on the
role of Central Bank transparency and credibility in the formulation of inflation
expectations (Masson et al., 1997).
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As mentioned, a new draft law for the CBE amending the previous Law no. 88
of 2003 of the "Central Bank, Banking Sector and Monetary System" is currently
under review. Although the draft law contains provisions which strengthen the
operational independence of the CBE as the sole entity entitled to the autonomous
conduct of monetary policy, it is lacking in terms of defining the mechanisms by
which the CBE is held accountable for the achievement (or lack thereof) of its targets;
a cornerstone of IT implementation and management. It is also unclear whether or not
the government will have a role in the setting of the inflation target in coordination
with the CBE. It is suggested that, at least in the first stages of IT adoption, there
should be cooperation and consensus between the CBE and the government in setting
the inflation target and this cooperation should be formalized and integrated into the
legal framework governing the institutional setup.
Additionally, there should be an official framework in place to curtail fiscal
dominance. As demonstrated by international experiences, efforts to achieve this can
be embodied in legal provisions that prohibit or place limitations on CBE lending to
the government and its entities or the monetization of government debts and deficits.
The IMF program that is currently ongoing already limits overdraft facilities by the
government from the CBE and prevents the CBE from participating in the primary
market for government securities. However, it is proposed that a complete formal
legal prohibition of CBE lending to the government be introduced in order to
strengthen credibility and free the CBE from any pressure to deviate its monetary
policy stance to accommodate government financing needs. Due to the intertwined
nature of the effects of fiscal policy and monetary policy, fiscal consolidation by
means of expenditure rationalization and tax system reform will strengthen the
effectiveness of monetary policy by minimizing the degree of fiscal dominance.
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The CBE will need to streamline its policy objectives towards the ultimate
goal of price stability and minimize its focus on other policy objectives such as the
management of the exchange rate. The liberalization of the exchange rate in
November 2016 is already a major step in that direction. It will be necessary to
emphasize this by formally including a provision isolating price stability as the
overriding objective of monetary policy within the legal framework.
Reforming the Central Bank legislative and regulatory framework will be a
fundamental step in the path towards making the institutional setting adequate for
adoption of IT. The main takeaways from the analysis of the legal framework
currently in place in Egypt, and benchmarking it against the international practices of
other IT countries are as follows:
•

Price stability should be outlined as the overriding objective of monetary
policy. It should be made clear that in the event of a conflict between price
stability and other macroeconomic objectives, price stability should take
precedence.

•

The CBE’s operational autonomy should continue to be emphasized and
strengthened under any revisions of the current law. However, international
experience has shown that, at least in the first phases of IT implementation, it
is advisable to provide the CBE with instrument independence but not full
goal independence. It has been shown that government involvement in setting
the inflation target that the CBE is held accountable for achieving provides
credibility gains that are desirable particularly in the IT initial adoption period.
In all cases, the mechanism for setting the inflation target should be defined
clearly in the legal framework governing the CBE.
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•

Prohibition of the monetary financing of government deficit should be
included within the articles of the Law on the Central Bank. If a full forced
ban of this practice is not possible, stricter limitations should be placed on
government deficit financing.

•

The composition of the BoD of the Central Bank should be revised to ensure a
clear and objective stance on monetary policy decision-making. Voting rights
should be limited to non-governmental members of the MPC as a safeguard
against fiscal dominance.

•

Transparency measures and procedures for holding the CBE accountable for
the achievement of the inflation target should be instilled in the CBE law.
These include the communication strategy for transferring information to the
public, as well as the measures that would be taken in case inflation
persistently deviates from the target.
On the technical side, the results obtained from fitting a VAR model and

performing subsequent Granger causality tests building from a two-variable model up
to a six-variable model indicate that the relationship between short-term interest rates
and inflation is not significant nor stable in Egypt. The fact that the overnight
interbank rate had a significant Granger-causality effect at all significance levels on
CPI when the two variable (CPI and Interest) and three variable (CPI, Interest and
M2) Granger causality tests were run indicates that adding the FX and the
Government Expenditure variables to the model caused the effect of the overnight
interbank rate to weaken from significant to insignificant. This supports the claim that
the presence of a high degree of fiscal dominance and a high ERPT effect dampen the
strength of the relationship between the CBE’s operational target and its ultimate one.
The deficiency of the statistical link between the interest rate as the CBE’s operational
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monetary policy tool and inflation is disconcerting, although unsurprising. Given the
rise of both variables almost monotonically since the beginning of 2016, it would be
natural to anticipate the difficulty for statistical tests to isolate the normal negative
relationship that theory suggests should exist between the two variables. Therefore,
this paper is optimistic that as economic reforms begin to reap their fruits and the
economy begins to stabilize, it is likely that the statistical relationship between
interest rates and inflation will strengthen over the medium term.
The CBE will need to select an appropriate index for inflation for the inflation
target. It is recommended that headline inflation be used for the inflation target itself
in accordance with international practices, but that core inflation is closely and
attentively monitored to enhance understanding of developments in the price level and
guide policy making accordingly. It is suggested that the CBE take steps towards
improving its technical capabilities, including the quality of data, forecasting
capabilities, and understanding of transmission mechanisms of monetary policy. It
would be beneficial to leverage the IMF’s current support of Egypt’s economic
reform program to acquire technical assistance from the IMF on these issues. Another
critical component in building the technical proficiency of the CBE will be to develop
a solid communication mechanism that bolsters the transparency of monetary policy.
Indeed, the effectiveness of an IT regime largely relies on the degree of credibility of
the central bank and ultimately the influence it has on inflation expectations,
underscoring the importance of a communication strategy based on transparency and
accountability of the central bank. The publishing of a “Monetary Policy Report” on a
quarterly basis by the CBE is already a major step in this direction.
What has been made clear throughout the analysis is that the transition to IT
needs to be a gradual and sequential process, with the prioritization of the
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development of the institutional setting the involved entities at the forefront of the
transitional agenda. As evidenced by the experiences in the international context,
Egypt faces significant challenges that make the transition to a fully-fledged IT
regime in the near term problematic to say the least. The road towards a fully fledged
IT regime is still a long, intricate and tedious one for Egypt especially considering the
fact that the economy is still battling double-digit inflation and a persistently high
budget deficit. Institutional and regulatory reform should be prioritized since these
require sustained political commitment that takes time and to assemble and fortify.
Nonetheless, and in line with the current overall economic reform agenda that
Egypt has embarked on recently, taking steps that have been formally planned,
prioritized and rationalized to prepare the economy for an IT regime will be desirable.
In this regard, the CBE has already taken serious steps towards setting the stage for a
formal IT regime, including the liberalization of the exchange rate, the announcement
of a target for inflation by the end of 2018, embarking on an ambitious fiscal
consolidation program, and the development and dissemination of an official
“Monetary Policy Report” on a quarterly basis. Overall, this paper is optimistic about
the ability of the CBE to overcome the aforementioned challenges towards a fullyfledged IT regime in Egypt, provided sustained political commitment and proper
prioritization and implementation of the transitional agenda continue to be realized.
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Appendix
VAR Model Results
Table 14: Vector Autoregressive Model (VAR) Results
No. of Obs =38 R. sq = 0.6347
Coef.
Std. Err.

P>|z|

0.0421157
0.0713739
-0.0464113
-0.0121003

0.019947398
0.017042602
0.018986888
0.017596837

0.012
0.000
0.015
0.492

0.003218274
0.038140826
-0.083435731
-0.046414132

0.0812126
0.1047774
-0.009197
0.0223895

0.9204492
0.8146206
0.8341559
-0.1845211

0.170293744
0.273376615
0.279499385
0.198010923

0.000
0.003
0.000
0.349

0.5883764
0.2815362
0.2891321
-0.5706425

1.252522
1.347705
1.3791797
0.2016002

-.0022995
-.0031347
-.002695
.0128369

.0084922
.0062371
.0054833
.0078186

0.787
0.615
0.623
0.101

-.0189439
-.0153592
-.013442
-.0024872

.014345
.0090897
.008052
.028161

.1134664
-.01959
.0821728
-.0255005

.03546
.0397318
.0364149
.0391652

0.001
0.622
0.024
0.515

.043966
-.0974629
.0108009
-.1022629

.1829668
.0582828
.1535447
.0512619

.0112055
.0401185
.0238942
.0186258

.0135356
.0200779
.0189888
.0153889

0.408
0.046
0.208
0.226

-.0153238
.0007666
-.0133231
-.0115358

.0377347
.0794704
.0611115
.0487874

.0764243
.1954687
.0250606
.1456081

.0801329
.0718473
.0645761
.0643253

0.340
0.007
0.698
0.024

-.0806334
.0546505
-.1015063
.0195329

.2334819
.3362869
.1516274
.2716834

.0527576
.0181577
Source: Author’s Calculation

0.004

.0171691

.0883461

dcpi
L1
L2
L3
L4
dm2
L1
L2
L3
L4
dinterest
L1
L2
L3
L4
dfx
L1
L2
L3
L4
dgvt
L1
L2
L3
L4
dgdp
L1
L2
L3
L4
cons

95% CI
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Vector Error Correction (VEC) Model Results
As per the literature and given the relatively short time span covered by the
data (eleven and a half years), a more thorough analysis involving long-run
cointegrating relationships was not included in this paper. In general, the presence of
cointegration implies that there exists some form of linear combination of the time
series of variables that produces a long-run relationship between them (Murray,
1994). In other words, the presence of cointegration between non-stationary variables
would imply the existence of a common stochastic non-stationary process underlying
two or more of the variables. A VEC model is more equipped to deal with
cointegrated nonstationary time series, since it has limitations on cointegration built
into its specification; however, VAR models are preferred if no cointegration exists
(Yamada & Toda, 1998). The general specification of the VEC model is based upon
an autoregressive distributed lag model:
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴0 + 𝐴1 𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝐵0 𝑋𝑡 + 𝐵1 𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡
where the parameter B0 denotes the short-run reaction of Yt after a change in
Xt . The long-run effect is given when the model is in equilibrium where: Y* = α +
βX*. The error correction model (ECM) is then shown as:
∆𝑌𝑡 = 𝐵1 ∆𝑋𝑡 − Π(𝑌𝑡−1 − 𝛼 − 𝐵𝑋𝑡−1 ) + 𝑢𝑡
∆𝑌𝑡 = 𝐵1 ∆𝑋𝑡 − Π𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡
where Π = (1 − 𝐴0 )
B = (𝐵1 + 𝐵0 )/ (1 − 𝐴0 )
The two variables 𝑌𝑡 and 𝑋𝑡 are cointegrated and ECM incorporates the short-run and
long run effects. This is because the long-run equilibrium (𝑌𝑡−1 − 𝛼 − 𝐵𝑋𝑡−1 ) is
included in the model together with the short-run dynamics captured by the
differenced term.
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To confirm the robustness of the results obtained from the VAR model, a VEC
model was also run on the data to compare the results. The results of the VEC model
are presented below:
Table 15: VEC Model Results
Effect on CPI

Coefficient

Standard

P>|z|

Error

95%

Confidence

Interval

d.CPI
LD.

.5407824

.2216468

0.015

.1063626

.9752021

L2D.

.6371643

.1691856

0.000

.3055666

.968762

L3D.

.4256421

.1750348

0.015

.0825802

.7687039
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Source: Author’s calculations.
The results of the VECM are consistent with those of the six-variable VAR
model. It is found that the interest rate does not significantly affect CPI at all
significance levels and at all lag orders. M2 is significant at the 5% at the first and
second lag, although it becomes insignificant after the second lag. The same is true
for government expenditure and the exchange rate. It is also found that lagged values
of CPI have a significant effect on current CPI at the 5% level. This indicates that
inflation is an inertial phenomenon in Egypt, driven by expectations of inflation based
on historical inflation rates. Overall, the VECM results corroborate the robustness of
the VAR model results.
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Impulse Response Graphs
Figure 26: Impulse Response of CPI to GDP

Figure 27: Impulse Response of CPI to FX
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Figure 28: Impulse Response of CPI to Government Expenditure
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